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Uhlmann:

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME REDUX:
CHARGING TRENDS, AGGRAVATING
FACTORS, AND INDIVIDUAL OUTCOME
DATA FOR 2005-2014
David M. Uhlmann *
In a 2014 article entitled “Prosecutorial Discretion and
Environmental Crime,” 1 I presented empirical data developed by student
researchers participating in the Environmental Crimes Project at the
University of Michigan Law School. My 2014 article reported that 96
percent of defendants investigated by the United States Environmental
Protection Agency and charged with federal environmental crimes from
2005 through 2010 engaged in conduct that involved at least one of the
aggravating factors identified in my previous scholarship, namely
significant harm, deceptive or misleading conduct, operating outside the
regulatory system, and repetitive violations. On that basis, I concluded
that prosecutors charged violations that included those aggravating
factors in nearly every case over a six-year period—and that defendants
who committed environmental violations that did not involve one of those
aggravating factors were unlikely to face criminal charges.
In this Article, I provide the latest data from the Environmental
Crimes Project, which now includes defendants charged from 2005
through 2014. I again find that most defendants charged with federal
environmental crimes committed violations that involved at least one of
the four aggravating factors, with the levels even higher (98 percent of all
defendants). I identify shifts in the data, the most notable of which are a
dramatic drop in the number of cases and defendants charged during the
last year of our data, a significant increase in the number of criminal
charges brought under the Clean Air Act for non-asbestos abatement
violations, and a nearly 40 percent increase in the percentage of

*
Jeffrey F. Liss Professor from Practice and Director of the Environmental Law and
Policy Program at the University of Michigan Law School. Portions of this article are adapted
from my October 2017 article, Prosecutorial Discretion and Environmental Crimes: Updated
Environmental Crimes Project Data presented to the American Bar Association, Section of
Environment, Fall Meeting in Baltimore Maryland. I would like to thank JJ Prescott for his
comments regarding our statistical analysis. I am indebted to Parks Barroso, Drew Kramer,
Allison Lasher, David Treadaway, and Emily Van Dam for their research assistance and to
all of the students who have served as Environmental Crimes Project supervisors since
2010. I also am grateful to the more than 300 Michigan Law students who have participated
in the Environmental Crimes Project over the last nine academic years. Appendix A to this
article provides a list of all Michigan Law students who have participated in the Environmen-tal
Crimes Project.
1. David M. Uhlmann, Prosecutorial Discretion and Environmental Crime, 38 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 159 (2014).
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defendants operating outside the regulatory system. I assess trends
since Supreme Court decisions that restricted Clean Water Act
jurisdiction 2 and made federal sentencing guidelines advisory, 3 and I
analyze cases that fall outside my normative model and may pose
questions about how prosecutors exercised their discretion.
In addition, for the first time, I provide outcome data regarding
environmental crime, which demonstrates that overall conviction rates
are higher for environmental crime than in the federal system generally
and for regulatory crime in particular, but are not as robust at trial. I also
provide incarceration data, which shows that fewer environmental
defendants are incarcerated than other regulatory crime defendants. I
analyze whether there is any correlation between incarceration and the
statutes charged, the presence of aggravating factors, or whether
defendants plead guilty or are convicted after trial. The incarceration data
shows a statistically significant correlation between the number of
aggravating factors and whether a defendant is incarcerated. The
incarceration data also shows a strong correlation between conviction at
trial and incarceration, with defendants who are convicted at trial more
than twice as likely to be sentenced to a period of incarceration than
defendants who pleaded guilty.
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INTRODUCTION
In January 2009, during my second year as a University of Michigan
law professor, I participated in a symposium at the University of Utah Law
School entitled “Environmental Criminal Prosecution: Essential Tool or
Government Overreaching?” 4 As the title suggests, the conference
brought together academics and practitioners with a wide range of views
about the efficacy of the federal government’s environmental crimes program. The symposium covered a range of topics, including the role of
harm in environmental prosecutions and the sentences imposed for environmental crime.5 Both are topics that I have considered in my subsequent research but, for the Utah conference, I was asked to address a
contentious question that the environmental laws do not answer well:
when is criminal prosecution appropriate for environmental violations? 6
You might say I was not an unbiased commentator. Before becoming
a law professor, I served for seventeen years as a prosecutor in the United

4. The Utah Law Review published a symposium issue based on the proceedings.
Symposium, Environmental Criminal Prosecution: Essential Tool or Government Overreaching?, 4 UTAH L. REV. 1097 (2009). In an article that I contributed to the symposium issue, I
discussed for the first time the aggravating factors that I assert should be present in cases
that are charged criminally under the federal environmental laws. David M. Uhlmann, Envi-

ronmental Crime Comes of Age: The Evolution of Criminal Enforcement in the Environmental
Regulatory Scheme, 4 UTAH L. REV. 1223 (2009).
5. See, e.g., Susan F. Mandiberg, Locating the Environmental Harm in Environmental Crimes, 4 UTAH L. REV. 1177 (2009); Michael M. O’Hear, Bark and Bite: The Environmental Sentencing Guidelines After Booker, 4 UTAH L. REV. 1151 (2009).

6. University of Utah Law Professor Scott Matheson invited me to participate in the
conference, and his colleague Bob Adler—then the associate dean for research and more
recently dean —encouraged me to talk and write about what makes environmental violations
criminal. I am grateful to both of them.
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States Department of Justice’s Environmental Crimes Section (ECS), the
last seven as ECS Chief. I had prosecuted dozens of cases in my ten
years as a trial attorney and supervisor, including trials in Idaho, Missouri,
South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wyoming. As ECS Chief, I approved all
indictments and plea agreements in cases prosecuted by the Section, as
well as major declinations. Yet, because of my Justice Department experience, I knew how much discretion prosecutors enjoy under the federal
environmental laws and, as a result, how challenging it is for practitioners
to advise their clients prospectively about when environmental violations
might result in criminal prosecution.
Of course, prosecutors enjoy broad discretion throughout the criminal
justice system; prosecutors and defense attorneys routinely argue about
whether criminal prosecution is appropriate and, if so, what charges
should be brought. 7 Yet historically, environmental criminal enforcement
attracted more controversy than other areas of federal criminal law on the
threshold question of what conduct should be criminalized. 8 Some of this
controversy may be a function of the debate over the role of environmental
regulation more generally. If we lack widespread agreement about how
much we should regulate business activity in the environmental context—
which clearly is the case—it should be no surprise that we also would lack
consensus about which environmental violations should be criminalized.
But the controversy over environmental criminal enforcement is at
least partially attributable to the fact that Congress did little to distinguish
between criminal, civil, and administrative violations when it enacted the
environmental laws. 9 As I have noted elsewhere, most environmental violations satisfy the act requirement under federal environmental laws. 10

7. See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, The Rhetoric of Environmental Crime: Culpability,
Discretion, and Structural Reform, 84 IOWA L. REV. 115, 126-27 (1998); see also David A.
Barker, Note, Environmental Crimes, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Civil/Criminal Line,
88 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1420-21 (2002) (stating that broad prosecutorial discretion is “quite
typical of criminal law” and may be less objectionable in the context of environmental crimes,
“where most defendants will be quite capably represented”).
8. See Keith A. Onsdorff & James M. Mesnard, The Responsible Corporate Officer
Doctrine in RCRA Criminal Enforcement: What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You, 22 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10099, 10104 (1992); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”:
Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV.
193, 210-13 (1991) (objecting to the alleged “diminution of mens rea” by environmental statutes); see also Kevin A. Gaynor et al., Environmental Criminal Prosecutions: Simple Fixes
for a Flawed System, 3 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 11-12 (1992).
9. Uhlmann, supra note 1, at 162.
10. Uhlmann, supra note 4, at 1242 (“Stated differently, the act requirement is the
same for criminal, civil, and administrative cases; the primary distinguishing feature of criminal enforcement is the mental state requirement.”). For example, the EPA is empowered to
stop a violator from discharging in violation of the Clean Water Act (Sections 309 and 404)
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Stated differently, nearly every violation of the environmental laws could
result in criminal prosecution, civil penalties, administrative action, or no
enforcement at all. Mental state requirements add an additional evidentiary burden for prosecutors. Yet most environmental violations easily
meet the knowing mental state requirement that applies to the majority of
felony violations in the federal system, because most environmental violations occur intentionally, not by mistake or accident. 11 As a result, overbreadth claims about environmental criminal enforcement are not limited
to the “usual suspects” (i.e. criminal defense attorneys or commentators
who argue that environmental protections are too burdensome).12 Indeed,
even academics that are supportive of strong environmental protections
have raised questions about whether the environmental laws delineated
an appropriate role for criminal enforcement. 13
At the conference in Salt Lake City, and in a subsequent article for the
Utah Law Review, I argued that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion
required more than a rote elements analysis of whether the defendant had
committed an environmental violation and acted with the requisite mental
state (knowingly for most felony violations and negligently for most misdemeanors). 14 I claimed that prosecutors would meet their obligation to do
justice—and have a better chance of securing convictions in cases that
went to trial—if they limited criminal enforcement to cases where aggravating factors were present that justified treating the violation as criminal. 15
Based on my experience at the Justice Department, I identified significant
harm, deceptive or misleading conduct, operating outside the regulatory
system, and repetitive violations as aggravating factors. 16
During the Utah conference, there was general agreement that the
presence of the aggravating factors I identified might justify criminal enforcement. That alone was a breakthrough of sorts. During my seventeen

through either administrative compliance orders, civil judicial enforcement actions, or criminal judicial enforcement actions. The EPA and the US Army Corps of Engineers generally
have discretion in choosing when and what type of enforcement to pursue. CWA Section
404 Enforcement Overview, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (last updated Oct. 25, 2018),
https://www.epa.gov/cwa-404/cwa-section-404-enforcement-overview.
11.

Uhlmann, supra note 1, at 169-71.

See O’Hear, supra note 5, at 1165; see also Mandiberg, supra note 5, at 1178.
13. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demand of Integration in the Evolution
of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407, 2453-55
12.

(1995) (arguing that Congress failed to specify a state of mind that reflects heightened levels
of culpability for environmental crime).
14.

Uhlmann, supra note 4, at 1245.

15.

Id. at 1247-48, 1252.
Id. at 1245-52. These factors are discussed in detail in infra Part I.

16.
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years at the Justice Department, there was little agreement on the theoretical question of what justified criminal charges, let alone whether the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Justice
Department adhered to such norms. Where commentators disagreed in
Utah was over the question of whether prosecutors were exercising their
discretion in the ways that I argued they should. To answer that question,
everyone relied to varying degrees on perceptions and individual cases or
“horror stories” of prosecutorial discretion run amok, which I encountered
in practice as well. In other words, the question clearly warranted empirical
study. In part for that reason—and because there was insufficient data
available about environmental criminal enforcement—I created the Environmental Crimes Project (ECP) during fall 2010.
Since 2010, I have worked with more than 300 Michigan Law students
to analyze every pollution case investigated by the EPA that resulted in
criminal charges since January 2005. 17 My students collect what I refer to
as “quantitative” data, including where the violations occurred and where
charges were filed, whether the defendants were individuals or corporations, what statutes were charged, and what outcome resulted. My students also collect what I refer to as “qualitative” data, namely the presence
or absence of the aggravating factors that I discussed at the Utah conference and in my scholarship.
In a 2014 Harvard Environmental Law Review article, I presented the
results from the first six years (2005-2010) of cases analyzed by the Environmental Crimes Project. 18 From a quantitative standpoint, I reported
that Title 18 of the United States Code, which makes it a crime to commit
conspiracy, false statements, fraud, and obstruction of justice, was the
most frequently charged statute for environmental crimes. Among environmental statutes, prosecutors charged violations of the Clean Water Act
most frequently, followed by the Clean Air Act, the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (hazardous waste violations), and the Act to Prevent
Pollution from Ships. 19
From a qualitative standpoint, I determined that 96 percent of the defendants charged with environmental crimes (828 out of 864 defendants)
committed violations with one or more aggravating factors present. The
most prevalent aggravating factors were repetitive violations (78 percent)

17. The Environmental Crimes Project does not analyze wildlife crime, although it is a
growing area of prosecution activity, because most of those cases are investigated by the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service, not EPA. Likewise, the Environmental Crimes Project does not include data from state cases, since most of those cases are investigated (and
prosecuted) by state law enforcement personnel.
18.

Uhlmann, supra note 1.

19.

Id. at 183-93
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and deceptive or misleading conduct (63 percent). These findings led me
to conclude that one or more aggravating factors were present in nearly
all environmental prosecutions and that violations that did not involve aggravating factors were unlikely to result in criminal charges. 20 I also determined that two or more of the aggravating factors were present in 74 percent of the cases, with the most dominant relationship one of the first three
factors (harm, deceptive or misleading conduct, and operating outside the
regulatory system) present alongside repetitiveness. In other words, 71
percent of the defendants engaged in repetitive misconduct—and either
caused harm, utilized deceptive or misleading conduct, or operated outside the regulatory system. 21
To some degree, the original publication of the Environmental Crimes
Project data may have quieted the debate among environmental crimes
practitioners. I suspect that there still are attorneys and companies who
feel that EPA and the Justice Department act inappropriately in individual
cases, but there seems to be less of a tendency to utilize those cases to
make a broad-side attack on environmental criminal enforcement. To be
clear, in my original article, I did not purport to demonstrate what makes
environmental cases criminal. It is not clear to me that this is possible,
and, at a minimum, it would require analyzing charged cases against a
control group of declined cases—which are not public—or at the very least
a comparison group of civil cases. Civil cases involve notice pleading, and
therefore do not lend themselves to the aggravating factor analysis we
conduct for criminal cases.22
Yet, while the claims I make about environmental criminal enforcement may be modest, they nonetheless provide a sense of rationality
about when criminal charges occur. My research also provides empirical
support for the notion that criminal cases have defining characteristics—
and therefore environmental violations without those characteristics are
not likely to result in criminal charges. I would submit those are significant
contributions in a field that seemed random, and where practitioners lamented that whether a case was criminal depended on where at EPA the
matter originated. 23
In this Article, I provide an update regarding the findings of the Environmental Crimes Project. I start by examining whether the charging
trends we saw from 2005 through 2010 continued during the subsequent

20.
21.
22.

Id. at 193-95.
Id. at 204-06.
Id. at 166.

23. Judson W. Starr, Turbulent Times at Justice and EPA: The Origins of Environmental Criminal Prosecutions and the Work that Remains, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 900, 913-14
(1991).
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four years, notwithstanding a significant drop in the number of prosecutions during 2014. I note shifts in the charging data, including an increase
in the number of prosecutions for non-asbestos abatement violations of
the Clean Air Act, an increase in the use of endangerment charges in
Clean Air Act cases, and a decrease in the number of hazardous waste
prosecutions—but the core focus on Title 18 violations remains. I then determine whether the aggravating factor analysis that was the primary contribution of my 2014 article remains accurate. I identify a significant increase in the number of defendants who operated outside the regulatory
scheme—but the core conclusions about the presence of aggravating factors remains accurate. I also seek to address new questions in this Article:
(1) what is the conviction rate for environmental crime; (2) how often are
convicted environmental criminals sent to jail; (3) what is the relationship,
if any, between the statutes charged and whether individuals go to jail;
and (4) are there other factors that may influence whether individuals go
to jail for environmental crime. These are all questions that prior empirical
research about environmental crime has not addressed.
Part I of this Article describes the revised methodology for the Environmental Crimes Project, including minor changes we have made in how
we code for aggravating factors since publication of my 2014 article. Part
II provides updated data regarding charging trends for environmental
crime. Part III analyzes updated data regarding aggravating factors in environmental prosecutions. Part IV explores the relationship between aggravating factors, including an assessment of the cases where no aggravating factors were present. Part V presents outcome information
regarding conviction and incarceration rates for environmental crime.

I. REVISED ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES PROJECT METHODOLOGY 24
The Environmental Crimes Project (ECP) is a collaborative facultystudent research project at the University of Michigan Law School. I
formed ECP in 2010 to collect data to assess the assertions I made at the
Utah conference and in my subsequent scholarship regarding aggravating

24. The ECP methodology described in this Part is an updated version of what was
detailed in Part II of my 2014 article published by the Harvard Environmental Law Review.
Uhlmann, supra note 1, at 177-82. Where the methodology is unchanged, I present an
abridged (or in some cases excerpted) description in this article. The original article included
data about 864 defendants charged between 2005-2010; we now have data regarding 882
defendants from that time period, because we now have completed analysis of defendants
whose cases remained pending in 2014. For consistency between my earlier publication and
this article, I will reference the original 864 defendants when I reference the Harvard article
but otherwise will reference the updated 2005-2010 data in this article.
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factors in environmental crimes, as well as to explore patterns in environmental criminal enforcement. Each year, I work with a small group of student supervisors who oversee student volunteers who obtain, examine,
and analyze charging documents, plea agreements, judgments, and other
court documents for all defendants charged with environmental crimes
that EPA investigated. Students then upload the results of this data collection effort to a database for further analysis. Since ECP began nearly
nine years ago, more than 300 Michigan Law students have participated,
collecting data on nearly 1,500 defendants. In this Part, I describe the ECP
methodology, including our quantitative and qualitative data analysis.

A. Overview of ECP Methodology
The goals of ECP remain to collect quantitative data and qualitative
data regarding the prosecution of environmental crime. For purposes of
this Article, the term “quantitative data” includes the location of the
charged crimes, whether corporations or individuals were charged, the
positions defendants held within a company, the size of the business entities involved, which statutes were charged, and the outcomes by defendant. The term “qualitative data” tracks the presence or absence of aggravating factors that I have argued should be present to justify criminal
charges for environmental violations.
It merits re-emphasis that these aggravating factors may also be present in civil or administrative cases. I therefore do not suggest that the
presence of aggravating factors makes a case criminal or is dispositive of
whether the case will be charged criminally. Instead, my assertion is that
one or more aggravating factors should be present in any case that is
criminally charged—and that violations without one of more aggravating
factors may not be appropriate for criminal prosecution. Properly understood, the presence or absence of aggravating factors should help practitioners better predict whether a case might result in criminal charges and
should promote better understanding about how prosecutorial discretion
is exercised for environmental criminal enforcement.
Since 2010, EPA has provided ECP a biennial list of defendants investigated by EPA and charged by the Justice Department with environmental crimes. Students then obtain court documents and other public information for each case, upload those documents to our electronic
database, review each case, and—after receiving training and a detailed
analysis guide—complete an online form collecting both the quantitative
and qualitative data discussed in this article. For each case, students analyze at a minimum the docket, indictment or information, and the final
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judgment. When available, students examine other court documents.25 To
collect corporate prosecution data, which we began doing in 2014, students rely on online business databases such as Mantis and Orbis, in addition to descriptions in court documents and government press releases.
We have completed analysis on all defendants prosecuted under the
federal environmental statutes who were charged from January 1, 2005
through December 31, 2014. Students add new cases to the database as
core documents become available, but these new cases are not analyzed
as part of the dataset until multiple rounds of student and supervisor review takes place. The data collected from these case documents have
been aggregated and organized in a searchable database that facilitates
research and analysis of environmental criminal enforcement.
The ECP database continues to exclude several categories of defendants. 26 First, we exclude cases that were charged before 2005, since EPA
switched case management systems in 2005 and is best able to ensure
the completeness of its data starting in that year. Second, we omit state
cases brought by state prosecutors, since EPA works on only a small percentage of the cases that are prosecuted in state court (the majority of
which are investigated by state law enforcement personnel). Third, we do
not include cases involving only wildlife crime, even though wildlife crime
is one of the largest areas of environmental prosecution,27 since most
wildlife crime is investigated by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. We do include, however, cases that involve both pollution violations

25. Occasionally, when available, government press releases are also consulted and
are used to resolve issues that are not clear from the court documents.
26. As a result, the data that I present in this article may differ from information provided by EPA on its website. See, e.g., Summary of Criminal Prosecutions, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/summary-criminal-prosecutions
(last visited Mar. 21, 2019).
27. ECS (along with its partners in the United States Attorneys’ Offices) prosecutes
many wildlife crimes, including wildlife smuggling, in addition to enforcing the nation’s major
environmental laws, such as the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ENV’T & NAT. RES. DIV., ENRD
ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 9-11, 28-30 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/enrd/page/file/1058046/download. The United Nations Office on Drugs & Crimes
reports that wildlife crime is the fifth largest category of transnational crime (by amount of
proceeds), after drugs, counterfeiting, human trafficking, and oil. It is estimated that proceeds
from wildlife crimes is about $7.8-10 billion annually. See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS
AND CRIMES, ESTIMATING ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS RESULTING FROM DRUG TRAFFICKING AND
OTHER TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME 38 (2011), https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Illicit-financial-flows_31Aug11.pdf. But because of the difficulty in placing a value on the illegal wildlife trade, the annual proceeds (and resulting ranking) may be even higher. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIMES, WORLD WILDLIFE
CRIME: TRAFFICKING IN PROTECTED SPECIES 20 (2016), https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/wildlife/World_Wildlife_Crime_Report_2016_final.pdf.
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and wildlife crime. 28 Finally, we exclude cases that charge only non-environmental crimes, such as tax violations, even if those cases were investigated by EPA, 29 as well as those for which researchers could not find
court documents.
Students collect four categories of data by defendant: (1) case information; (2) defendant information; (3) outcome information; and (4) aggravating factors. I briefly describe each category below and the applicable
methodology and note any changes in methodology from my 2014 Harvard Environmental Law Review article. The first three categories are considered quantitative, while the fourth is considered qualitative.

B. Quantitative Data Collection and Analysis
For case information, researchers record the case name, defendant
name, city and state of violation, docket number, EPA region, federal judicial district, judge name, charging date, and statutes charged. We use
this data to identify changes in enforcement levels from year-to-year and
to conduct analysis of charging trends. In the future, we hope to examine
enforcement levels in different parts of the country and the extent to which
there may be geographical disparities in the prosecution of environmental
crime.
For defendant information, researchers categorize each defendant as
either an individual, corporation, or governmental entity. 30 Researchers
code each case based upon what types of defendants were charged: individuals affiliated with an organizational entity, organizational entities,
both individuals and organizational entities, or people or government entities that were not affiliated with a business. For individual defendants,
28. So, for example, we omit cases charging only violations of the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, but we retain cases involving Clean Air Act violations and Migratory Bird Treaty
Act charges. In addition, while the misuse of pesticide may not be a classic form of pollution
activity, we include charges brought under federal pesticide laws in our definition of pollution
crime.
29.
To determine if non-environmental charges should be treated as environmental
crime, we looked for an environmental nexus to the crime. This requirement was not satisfied
solely by the fact that a company does environmental work, if the criminal activity was unrelated to the environmental work. For example, cases where defendants filed false tax returns
were excluded from our database, even though the tax violations were discovered during an
EPA investigation into asbestos companies defrauding the Small Business Administration.
On the other hand, we included in the database companies who committed fraud within the
environmental services industry (e.g. asbestos abatement companies using undocumented
workers to conduct illegal asbestos removal or companies engaging in fraudulent vehicle
emissions testing).
30. We also note whether individuals are affiliated with an organization (e.g. employees of a corporation that was involved in the criminal acts) or whether they were unaffiliated
with an organization.
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researchers note the type of defendant: public official, corporate officer,
manager, environmental compliance person, low-level employee,
owner/sole proprietor, or individual not associated with an organization.
For cases involving businesses, researchers note the defendant industry,
whether the business was publicly or privately held, and the approximate
size of the business. For both individuals and businesses, researchers
note whether the individual or business served as an independent contractor and the approximate size of the client company. I will examine this
corporate data and how it varies based on business size in a future article
regarding the prosecution of corporate environmental crime.
For outcome information, researchers record outcomes by defendant.
They indicate the disposition for each charged crime—guilty plea, guilty
verdict, acquittal, dismissal, or mistrial—and the final judgment date (or the
date on which all charges were dismissed). If the defendant ultimately pled
guilty or was convicted, researchers include whether it was a felony or
misdemeanor conviction; the length of jail and probation periods (if any);
the existence of cooperation agreements; the amounts of fines, restitution,
remedial, and community service payments; and the existence of courtordered environmental compliance plans. Part V of this Article will consider this data for individuals; I will address corporate data, as noted
above, in a future article regarding corporate environmental crime.

C. Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis
For aggravating factors, researchers review the court documents for
each defendant to determine the presence of the four aggravating factors
that I have argued should be present in criminal cases: significant environmental harm or public health effects, deceptive or misleading conduct,
operating outside the regulatory system, and repetitive violations. 31 Each
factor warrants further explanation.
The first aggravating factor, significant environmental harm or public
health effects, is limited to actual harm. I assume that risk of harm is present in most environmental cases, since nearly all environmental laws

31.

To facilitate our analysis of cases with no aggravating factors, which I present in

infra Section IV.B, students also note the presence of other potential aggravating factors.
For example, if researchers found that an additional factor, such as risk of danger to children
or the presence of other criminal conduct (such as a pesticide infraction combined with a
drug charge), seemed to be a driving force in the decision to press charges, they were directed to record the additional factor and its relevance. I do not utilize this information in my
aggravating factor calculations, since it would distort our findings, but it is helpful in trying to
understand why charges may have been brought in cases where my aggravating factors
were absent.
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seek to prevent public health effects. 32 I therefore determined that we
would code for harm only in cases that involved either animal mortality 33
or possessed the characteristics identified by the United States Sentencing Commission as warranting enhanced sentences based on harm: (a)
serious bodily injuries or deaths; (b) cleanup involving substantial expense (greater than $100,000); and (c) evacuation or urgent emergency
response.34 The one exception to the general exclusion of risk of harm is
that researchers coded for harm when the defendant was charged with
knowing or negligent endangerment under the environmental laws. 35
The second aggravating factor, deceptive or misleading conduct, covers dishonest behavior. Deceptive or misleading conduct can occur during the commission of an offense or after the offense has been committed
to conceal violations or mislead authorities. Researchers look for three
sub-characteristics: commission (situations where the substantive offense
involved deceptive conduct); false reporting or recordkeeping (such as falsification of discharge monitoring reports); and cover-up (efforts to hide
information about wrongdoing either in contemplation of an investigation
or when an investigation is ongoing).
The third factor, operating outside the regulatory system, focuses on
companies and individuals that completely and deliberately avoid regulatory compliance, thereby gaining an unfair economic advantage over competitors and undermining the effectiveness of the regulatory system. We
also code for four sub-characteristics: failure to acquire or renew permits,

32. See David M. Uhlmann, The Quest for a Sustainable Future and the Dawn of a
New Journal at Michigan Law, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1, 6 (2012).
33. We considered whether we should distinguish between types of animal mortality
based either on the number of animal deaths or the types of animals involved, since prosecutors presumably would view a major fish kill involving thousands of deaths differently than
an isolated death from misuse of a pesticide. We concluded, however, that there was not a
principled basis for distinguishing between either the number of deaths or the species involved. We also decided that, if the deaths were significant enough to be mentioned in a
charging document, we should treat them as significant too. We instead note both in our
database, and code for harm when there are any animal deaths.
34. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Q1.2-4 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2018). We use $100,000 as the cut-off for cleanup involving substantial expense based on
United States v. Bogas, 920 F.2d 363, 369 (6th Cir. 1990) (“[W]e are satisfied that the expenditure of tax dollars required for the cleanup came to a six-figure total. The finding that
cleanup did not require a ‘substantial’ expenditure was clearly erroneous.”).
35. The fact that the prosecutor brought an endangerment charge suggests that the
risk of death or serious bodily injury played a role in the government’s decision to bring criminal charges.
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failure to keep or maintain records, failure to monitor, and failure to report. 36 In the past, this category included defendants who were only nominally participating in the regulatory system, on the theory that minimal
participation was tantamount to non-participation. But with the benefit of
hindsight, this seemed too subjective: what is nominal and at what point
do defendants become non-participants in the regulatory system? We
therefore re-coded all defendants so that only those who were evading
regulation completely were considered operating outside the regulatory
system. 37
The fourth factor, repetitive violations, focuses on the duration of noncompliance. This is a difficult factor to analyze, because prosecutors often
allege a long period of misconduct without making clear how many violations occurred during that time period. My assertion is that, in most instances, there is a qualitative difference between isolated violations and
those that are repeated over a long period of time. Researchers therefore
calculated both the number of days of violations alleged in the indictment
(when it was possible to do so), as well as the duration between the first
and last day of violations charged in the indictment. The one exception
was with Title 18 conspiracy charges: if either the first or the last date of
the conduct only involved non-substantive acts, these dates were disregarded. In other words, merely planning to violate the environmental laws,
without any attempt to actually do so, was not included in this analysis.
Researchers also recorded the duration of all environmental criminal violations alleged in the indictment, even if entities were not charged with all
of those violations. Researchers coded as repetitive any case involving
either multiple days of violation or where the duration of the violations was
more than 24 hours.
Here too, we have made some adjustments since the first article in
how we code, since repetitiveness can be difficult to determine unless
prosecutors allege specific days of violations. Most of the changes we
made were largely for clarification to ensure more complete and consistent coding. We now include misconduct contained in a conspiracy
36. Unlike the other prosecutorial discretion factors, researchers recorded evidence
of any of these sub-characteristics even if they ultimately determined that the defendant was
not operating outside the environmental regulatory system. Evidence that a defendant failed
to monitor emissions or maintain records in some instances, for example, remain valuable
data points. But the overall factor is aimed at those defendants who make no effort to comply
with environmental regulations.
37. This caused a very slight decrease in the number of defendants who were coded
as operating outside of the regulatory system. In my original article, I reported that 33.2% of
defendants charged between 2005-2010 operated outside of the regulatory system; after all
defendants had been re-coded, the percentage dropped slightly to 31.9% of all defendants
for the same time period. Our dataset also has changed somewhat now that we have completed analysis of cases that were still pending in 2014. See supra note 24.
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charge in calculating the duration of the charged conduct, which previously we only included if conspiracy was the only charge in the case. This
should not have changed how many cases were coded as repetitive, however, because we always included conspiracy in alleged misconduct,
which drives the repetitiveness determination. 38 We also determined that
we would not count as repetitive violations that occurred on two calendar
days but for less than 24 hours. This too did not have a significant impact
on our repetitiveness data but provided greater clarity. As with changes to
the third factor, we re-coded all cases to ensure a consistent methodology.
In multi-defendant cases, researchers coded the same aggravating
factors consistently for all defendants. This strategy reflects the view that
prosecutors make a threshold determination of whether an underlying violation warrants criminal prosecution. In other words, the egregiousness
of one defendant’s actions can affect the prosecutor’s decision to bring
criminal charges against all defendants. However, researchers made a
narrow exception for cases where a single or small number of defendants
in a multi-defendant case engaged in conduct that appeared to be truly
separate from the criminal activity driving the prosecution. The most common example of this type of conduct is perjury that occurs after initial criminal charges have been filed. In this case, a researcher would note “deceptive conduct” for only the defendant who committed perjury, and not
for related defendants.

D. Quality Assurance/Quality Control and Limiting Factors
ECP’s data collection and review processes are rigorous and undergo
constant refinement. I worked with the ECP supervisors over the last five
years to revise the analysis guide that we use to explain how to collect
quantitative data and how to code for aggravating factors. In collecting
data, students must explain each of their qualitative, aggravating factor
answers in a few brief sentences, with cites to the record. These explanations helped reviewers and supervisors ensure uniformity.
At least three students examined each defendant and entered data
into a protected online database accessible to all researchers. Any qualitative disputes were resolved by the ECP supervisors, with whom I met
regularly to discuss issues that arose during the research. To ensure uniformity, the supervisors conducted two final reviews of each case, paying
particular attention to each aggravating factor and the explanation given

38. The number of defendants from 2005-2010 who engaged in repetitive misconduct
increased from 78.5% in the original article to 81.2% in our current database. See infra note
98.
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by the students. When we decide that we needed to make a significant
change in how we code data, we re-coded all cases to reflect that change.
As with any comprehensive undertaking, ECP faces limiting factors.
First, as noted previously, it is not possible to develop a control group of
declined cases, since those are not public. It also is not feasible to create
a comparison group of civil cases, because those cases are based on notice pleading, without the type of information provided in charging documents that we use to conduct aggravating factor analysis.
Second, while we have made extensive efforts to analyze every case
charged since 2005, it was not possible to obtain information about every
matter. We obtained court documents for most cases using the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) system. Where documents
were not available on PACER, we contacted the clerk’s office to obtain the
documents. In nearly every instance, we were successful and could conduct our analysis. In a small number of cases, however, no court documents (or not all required documents) were available; those cases were
excluded from our dataset.
Third, information about the size of the company at the time of the
charges was not always readily available. Researchers made every effort
to determine the size of the company at the time it was charged, but sometimes information was conflicting or was absent, at which point researchers were instructed to use their best judgment and, if truly unable to determine company size, to omit that case from the corporate data analysis.
Finally, as I stated in my 2014 article, prosecutorial discretion is an
inherently subjective process.39 The aggravating factors that I have identified admit to definitional challenges. What harm is significant harm?
What deception qualifies as misleading conduct? When is noncompliance
so extensive that a company should be viewed as operating outside the
regulatory system? What qualifies as a repetitive violation? We have developed criteria for answering the questions raised by our research so that
students code consistently, and we re-assess those instructions regularly.
But our results are affected by our criteria and the choices they reflect.

II. PROSECUTION TRENDS AND FREQUENTLY CHARGED
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES
As I noted in my 2014 article, the environmental crimes program
should always be viewed in context: it involves fewer cases each year than
EPA refers to the Justice Department for civil enforcement and far fewer
than the agency addresses through administrative enforcement. In 2014,
39.

Uhlmann, supra note 1, at 182.
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the last of the ten years covered in this article, the Justice Department
prosecuted 107 defendants on criminal charges in 65 cases, while EPA
initiated 2,268 civil judicial and administrative cases. 40 Moreover, while
most environmental crimes are prosecuted in federal court, far more civil
and administrative cases are filed by state enforcement and regulatory
officials. 41
In this part, I examine overall prosecution trends and the extent to
which shifts may be occurring in the type of violations that are charged
criminally.

A. Overall Charging Data and EPA Agent Resources
From 2005-2010, the Justice Department brought criminal charges
against 882 defendants in 509 cases (based on EPA investigation numbers).42 Our updated data from 2005-2014 involves 1,479 defendants in
848 cases. The number of prosecutions per year ranges from a high of
191 defendants in 99 cases during 2011 and a low of 107 defendants in
65 cases during 2014, as shown in FIGURE 1 below.

40. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF ENF’T & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, FISCAL
YEAR 2014 EPA ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ANNUAL RESULTS 8 (2014),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-12/documents/fy-2014-enforcement-annual-results-charts-12-08-14.pdf.
41. See ENVTL. INTEGRITY PROJECT, ASSESSING STATE ENFORCEMENT: TOO MANY
CLAIMS, TOO LITTLE DATA 36 (2002), https://www.environmentalintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/2003-04_Too_Many_Claims_Too_Little_Data1.pdf; Uhlmann, supra note 1,
at 178 (“most [environmental] criminal cases are prosecuted in federal court”); cf. N.Y.U.
SCH. OF LAW, INST. FOR POLICY INTEGRITY, IRREPLACEABLE: WHY STATES CAN’T AND WON’T
MAKE UP FOR INADEQUATE FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS 1-2 (2017),
https://policyintegrity.org/files/media/EPA_Enforcement_June2017.pdf (“[S]tates
bring
about 90 percent of environmental enforcement actions each year.”).
42. In my Harvard article, I reported a higher number of cases because I calculated
case numbers based on federal district court docket numbers (which was the practice at
ECS). Uhlmann, supra note 1, at 183. Upon further consideration, however, EPA investigation numbers are a better way of capturing related defendants, since all charges resulting
from a particular investigation have the same case number, where a single investigation will
result in multiple federal district court case numbers if there are multiple indictments (or informations). In addition, as previously noted, the Harvard article referenced 864 defendants,
but our database now includes 882 defendants from 2005-2010, as additional cases have
been completed. See supra note 24.
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The average number of annual prosecutions across the ten years of our
dataset is 148 defendants in 85 cases. Only 2005 and 2011 exceeded the
average number of defendants prosecuted by more than 10 percent, while
2008, 2009, and 2014 fell more than 10 percent below the average number of defendants across the ten-year period. The high year (2011) clearly
was an outlier, involving a nearly 20 percent increase in the number of
defendants from the previous year and a more than 20 percent drop in the
following year. The low year (2014) also was an outlier in the dataset, but
it is noteworthy because it involved a nearly 30 percent drop in the number
of defendants from the previous year and is 15 percent less than the next
lowest year (2008). Moreover, while we have not completed our analysis
of cases charged during 2015 and 2016, a preliminary review suggests
that the downward trend that began in 2014 continued into 2015 and 2016.
Yearly variations in case numbers and defendants prosecuted are
normal in a law enforcement program with comparatively few agent resources. As I have noted in my prior articles on this topic, EPA is required
to employ 200 special agents nationwide, an extraordinarily modest number for a national law enforcement program that investigates sophisticated
white collar crime. 43 For comparison, although it has much broader re-

43. Uhlmann, supra note 4, at 1236, n.59 (regarding Pollution Prevention Act requirement that EPA employ 200 criminal investigators).
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sponsibilities, the FBI employs approximately 14,000 special agents nationwide. 44 With limited EPA agent resources and cases that vary in complexity, I would expect to see some year-to-year variations in environmental crimes data, even if agent resources were stable.
Normal variations in prosecution levels become accentuated when already limited agent resources are depleted by retirements and other departures, particularly if those occur during times when EPA is under a hiring freeze or otherwise unable to hire replacements. In recent years, EPA
often has had far less than the mandatory 200 agents, which makes it
even more difficult to maintain a robust law enforcement program and results in fewer investigations and prosecutions. 45 That problem may explain the drop-off in cases prosecuted during 2008-2009 and again during
2014. From 2005 to 2009, EPA had fewer than 200 agents each year. 46
Staffing levels rose just above 200 agents during 2010 and 2011, and then
dropped precipitously in the years that followed to 191 agents in 2012, 177
agents in 2013, and 168 agents in 2014.47 Given these staffing fluctuations, it is no surprise there were corresponding increases and decreases
in defendants charged.48
Another observation about the overall case data is that political commentators might expect to see disparate numbers when comparing Republican and Democratic administrations. Indeed, the overall prosecution
numbers suggest a drop-off in the final years of the George W. Bush administration and, perhaps as a result, the first year of Barack Obama’s
administration. But the Bush administration averaged 148.8 defendants

44.

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FY 2017 BUDGET REQUEST

1.
45. This problem may have worsened during the first two years of the Trump administration. See Press Release, Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility, Criminal Enforcement
Collapse at EPA (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.peer.org/news/press-releases/criminal-enforcement-collapse-at-epa.html (in April 2018 there were only 140 special agents, and that
number reportedly dropped to only 130 by January 2019).
46. ROBERT ESWORTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34384, FEDERAL POLLUTION
CONTROL
LAWS:
HOW
ARE
THEY
ENFORCED?
26
(2014),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34384.pdf.
47. Id. (regarding 2010-2013 data); Agent Count—8/8/17, PUB. EMPS. FOR ENVTL.
RESPONSIBILITY,
https://www.peer.org/assets/docs/8_24_17_CID_special_agent_numbers.pdf (last visited 3/1/2019) (for 2014 data).
48. When assessing the impact of reduced agent resources on prosecution levels, it
is worth bearing in mind that there is a lag between when investigations begin and when
prosecutors seek charges. During my tenure as Chief of the Environmental Crimes Section,
our goal was to bring charges within 12 to 18 months. More complex cases can take 2 to 3
years to investigate. As a result, a decline in agent resources should produce a drop in prosecution levels 1-3 years later—and an increase in agent resources should produce an increase in prosecution levels 1-3 years later.
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per year in the four years of data available, while the Obama administration averaged 147.3 defendants per year. Those relatively similar numbers are more consistent with the proposition that environmental criminal
enforcement has been non-partisan and receives consistent support
across presidential administrations. 49 In other words, even when administrations may differ about how much regulation is optimal, they want to
be seen as tough on crime—and therefore support a robust criminal enforcement effort—although early reports suggest that the administration of
Donald J. Trump may prove to be an exception to that pattern. 50
What is far less clear is whether Congress wants a robust environmental crimes program. In 1991, Congress required EPA to increase its
agent resources to 200 criminal investigators. Since that time, however,
Congress rarely has provided enough annual appropriations for EPA to
come close to those staffing levels. And, even on the rare occasions when
EPA has deployed 200 criminal investigators, the agency has not had the
resources it needs to address environmental violations in 50 states, each

49.

See David M. Uhlmann, Cover Story, Strange Bedfellows, 25 ENVTL. F. 40 (2008).

50. In February 2019, EPA provided us case information regarding criminal enforcement during the first two years of the Trump administration. We have not had the opportunity
to conduct our multi-phased review of those cases, however, many of which are still pending
matters. I am reluctant to place too much weight on early news articles suggesting a decline
in criminal enforcement, although they may prove to be accurate. See, e.g., Megan Guess,
EPA at a 30-year low for referring pollution cases for criminal prosecution, ARS TECHNICA
(Jan. 15, 2019), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/01/epa-at-a-30-year-low-for-referring-pollution-cases-for-criminal-prosecution/. But the EPA criminal program has continued
to struggle with decreased agent resources during the first two years of the Trump administration, a problem exacerbated by the use of criminal investigators to provide a security
detail for EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt. Id.; see, e.g., Umair Irfan, EPA watchdog: turns out
Scott Pruitt didn’t need 20 Security Guards, VOX (Sept. 5, 2018, 9:40 AM EDT)
https://www.vox.com/2018/9/5/17819548/epa-scott-pruitt-inspector-security-detail; see also
Dino Grandoni, The Energy 202: EPA loses a tenth of its criminal investigators since Trump’s
election, WASH. POST (June 21, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-energy-202/2018/06/21/the-energy-202-epa-loses-a-tenth-of-its-criminalinvestigators-since-trump-s-election/5b2aa8ea30fb046c468e6f1a/?noredirect=on&utm_
term=.dae5745b6e06 (stating that the number of CID agents fell from 157 in September
2016 to 140 in April 2018); cf. Juliet Eilperin & Brady Dennis, Under Trump, EPA Inspections
Fall to a 10-Year Low, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2019, 5:36 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2019/02/08/under-trump-epa-inspections-fall-yearlow/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.43cb0e44ab44
Under President Trump, the Environmental Protection Agency inspected fewer industrial facilities
during 2018 than at any time over the past decade . . . The sharp drop in inspections and evaluations last fiscal year . . . is only half the number the
EPA conducted at its peak in 2010 . . . . Other enforcement activities at the agency experienced
similar declines.
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of which has a unique demographic profile and therefore different types of
environmental violations. Based on my experience at the Justice Department, I would argue that a true commitment to strong criminal enforcement
would require twice as many criminal investigators, if not more, so EPA
could have a law enforcement presence in every state.
The most frequently charged statute in our updated study remains Title 18, which makes it a crime to commit conspiracy, 51 false statements,
obstruction of justice, and fraud. The most frequently charged environmental statute remains the Clean Water Act. There is a potentially significant increase in the percentage of Clean Air Act defendants, and a modest
increase in Title 18 defendants. At the same time, there are notable decreases in the percentage of Clean Water Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) charges, and a modest decrease in Act
to Prevent Pollution from Ships (APPS) charges. I discuss these shifts,
which are shown in FIGURE 2 below, 52 in the following sections.

51.
Nearly all conspiracy charges in our database involve 18 U.S.C. § 371 (the
general conspiracy statute). A small number of defendants were charged under other Title
18 conspiracy statutes, for example 18 U.S.C. § 1512(k) (criminalizing conspiracy to obstruct justice). We group all Title 18 conspiracy charges together for data analysis purposes.
52. Figure 2 and most of the charts in this article will compare data from the first six
years of the ECP, which was presented in my Harvard Environmental Law Review article,
with data from the last four years for which our analysis is complete (2010-2014). Where the
data suggests shifts that occur during different periods of time, for example between the first
five years and the second five years, I analyze accordingly.
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B. Title 18 Cases
As noted above, there is a modest increase in the percentage of Title
18 defendants when we expand from 2005-2010 to 2005-2014 (43.9 percent vs. 45.6 percent). Interestingly, our Title 18 data demonstrates that
the increase is not attributable to either conspiracy or false statement
charges, which are the largest subsets of Title 18 charges for environmental violations. There is a 2 percent decrease in the percentage of defendants charged with conspiracy and a nearly 15 percent decrease in the percentage of defendants charged with false statements under Title 18.
Instead, the increased percentage of Title 18 charges appears to be attributable to significant increases in the percentage of obstruction of justice (18 percent increase) and fraud charges (69 percent increase).
The Title 18 data is presented in FIGURE 3 below, showing each type
of violation as a percentage of all Title 18 defendants.

There may be an inverse relationship between the decrease in false statement charges and the increase in obstruction of justice charges. Prosecutors often prefer obstruction of justice charges to false statement charges
because obstruction charges can result in longer sentences under the federal sentencing guidelines. 53 The inclusion of obstruction charges also
may reflect the continued prevalence of vessel pollution cases, along with

53.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).
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a heightened focus on cases where defendants are engaging in conduct
that undermines regulatory efforts.
There also may be some relationship between the decrease of false
statement charges and the increase in fraud charges, although the increase in fraud charges may be more attributable to a surge in fraud in the
renewable fuels program, which emerged as an area of enforcement activity in the last few years. From 2005-2010, no defendants were prosecuted for Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs) violations; the number
of defendants prosecuted for RINs violations increased to 16 defendants
from 2011-2014. Another potential factor was an uptick in the number of
defendants charged with other types of fraud under the Clean Air Act, with
8 defendants charged during 2012 and 2013 (although none charged any
other year, including 2014). 54 Likewise, there was an increase in the number of defendants charged under Title 18 with violations involving Clean
Air Act mobile source programs, from 2 defendants in 2005-2010 to 17
defendants in 2011-2014.
The shift away from Title 18 false statement charges may also reflect
greater use of false statement charges under the substantive environmental statutes rather than under Title 18. Indeed, we see a small increase in
the percentage of cases charging false statements under the Clean Water
Act and the Clean Air Act, although not enough to account for the overall
decrease in Title 18 false statement charges. 55 But it seems unlikely that
prosecutors are focusing less on deceptive or misleading conduct, since
that aggravating factor remains present for more than 62 percent of the
defendants.
FIGURE 4 below shows the decrease in false statement charges by
year and the accompanying increase in fraud charges as a percentage of
Title 18 defendants, although it is not clear there is any relationship between the two (in some years fraud and false statement charges increase
or decrease together; in other years they have an inverse relationship).

54. This data does not include charges brought against Volkswagen and Audi, as well
as several of their employees, for the most notorious of the emissions fraud cases. The Justice Department first brought charges based on those violations in 2016.
55. Our data shows an increase in the number of defendants charged under the Clean
Water Act’s false statements provision. From 2005-2010, on average, 3.7 defendants were
charged each year; from 2011-2014, the average number of defendants charged each year
increased to 5.7. The data also shows an increase under the Clean Air Act’s false statements
provision, although it needs to be noted that our data does not discriminate between false
statements and tampering with a monitoring device. Comparing the first six years of data to
the last four, the average number of defendants charged increased from 8.3 defendants per
year to 12.5 defendants per year. For RCRA violations there was actually a slight decrease
in the amount of RCRA false statement charges, although this was such a small category as
to be relatively insignificant (it went from an average of 1 defendant per year to 0.25 defendants per year).
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The raw data underscores the increased use of fraud charges. From 20052009, the first five years covered by our data, prosecutors charged 42 defendants (an average of 8.3 defendants per year) with fraud. From 20102014, the second five years covered by the data, the numbers increase by
nearly 60 percent to 67 defendants (an average of 13.4 defendants per
year). To some extent, FIGURE 4 masks the increase in the number of fraud
defendants, because it compares percentages of Title 18 defendants, but
the increase in raw numbers is noteworthy nonetheless.
We will continue to track the increased use of obstruction of justice
and fraud charges—and the corresponding decrease in the use of Title 18
false statement charges. The increases may reflect increased reliance on
the familiar terrain of Title 18 to highlight the classic criminal features of
environmental crimes. Or they may reflect a shift in the type of cases selected for criminal enforcement, although if that were the case we would
expect to see a corresponding increase in the percentage of cases involving deceptive or misleading conduct, which has not occurred. 56

C. Clean Water Act Cases
The overall number of Clean Water Act defendants decreased by 1.4
percent when we expanded our study to 2005-2014, which corresponds

56.

See infra Section III.B.
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to a 3.4 percent decrease during the last four years of the study (34.9 percent from 2005-2010 and 31.5 percent from 2011-2014). Despite this
modest decrease, the Clean Water Act remained the most frequently
charged environmental statute, which may be attributable to the fact that
the core requirements of the Clean Water Act are the most straightforward
of the environmental laws. The Act states simply that “the discharge of any
pollutant by any person shall be unlawful” 57 except when permitted by
EPA or a state environmental regulatory agency. 58 Because it lacks the
statutory and regulatory complexity of other environmental statutes, the
Clean Water Act is best suited to the more rigorous proof requirements in
criminal cases and does not typically raise questions about statutory or
regulatory vagueness, which can give rise to due process and fair notice
concerns. The Clean Water Act data is presented in FIGURE 5 below,
showing each type of violation as a percentage of Clean Water Act defendants.

The most significant legal issue facing Clean Water Act prosecutions—
and one where due process/fair notice concerns could arise—involves the
jurisdictional reach of the Clean Water Act. The enactment of the Clean

57.

33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2012).

58. Id. In most states, EPA has delegated day-to-day regulatory and permitting authority under the Clean Water Act to the relevant state environmental agency. See NPDES
Permits Around the Nation, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/npdespermits (last visited Mar. 1, 2019).
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Water Act in 1972 extended jurisdiction from “navigable waters” that were
protected under the Rivers and Harbors Act 59 to include all “waters of the
United States.” 60 EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers subsequently
promulgated regulations that defined waters of the United States to include the entire tributary system to navigable-in-fact waters, as well as
adjacent wetlands. 61
Over time, however, concerns arose over the jurisdictional reach of
the Clean Water Act, principally with regard to wetlands, culminating in a
fractured Supreme Court decision in Rapanos v. United States that has
left the law a muddled mess. 62 Rapanos, which was decided in 2006, had
no majority opinion but most appellate courts followed Justice Kennedy’s
concurring opinion, which limited the jurisdictional reach of the Clean Water Act to wetlands and smaller tributaries that possess a “significant
nexus” to navigable-in-fact waters. 63 After the Rapanos decision, EPA and
the Corps relied on guidance documents to determine their jurisdiction, 64
until the Agencies developed a new “waters of the United States” definition
in 2015, 65 which immediately was challenged in court and is now the subject of a more restrictive rulemaking by the Trump administration.66
Given the lack of a majority opinion in Rapanos and the fact that the
Agencies were operating under guidance documents (and contemplating
a new rulemaking), it would not be surprising if prosecutors brought fewer
cases under the Clean Water Act post-Rapanos. On the one hand, Rapanos involved wetlands violations, which are not frequently prosecuted
criminally. From 2005-2014, there were 21 defendants charged with wet-

59.

33 U.S.C. § 403 (2012).

60. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2012) (defining the statutory term “navigable waters” to include “waters of the United States”).
61.

Definition of Waters of the United States, 33 C.F.R. § 328 (2012).

62. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (discussing the jurisdictional limits of the Clean Water Act over the course of 60 pages, with no majority opinion and
the Supreme Court disagreeing over the plain text of the statute, the meaning of the legislative history, and the Constitutional validity of various jurisdictional limits).
63. Id. at 767; Bradford C. Mank, Implementing Rapanos-Will Justice Kennedy’s Significant Nexus Test Provide A Workable Standard for Lower Courts, Regulators, and Developers?, 40 IND. L. REV. 291, 294-96 (2007) (surveying the approaches taken among the
lower circuits to the 4-1-4 split).
64. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY & U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, CLEAN WATER ACT
JURISDICTION FOLLOWING THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN RAPANOS V. UNITED
STATES & CARABELL V. UNITED STATES (Dec. 2, 2008), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-02/documents/cwa_jurisdiction_following_rapanos120208.pdf.
65. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States”, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,053
(June 29, 2015).
66.

See Exec. Order No. 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497 (Mar. 3, 2017).
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lands violations (1.5 percent of all defendants), compared with 384 defendants charged with violations involving the tributary system (26 percent
of all defendants). On the other hand, the jurisdictional uncertainty created
by Rapanos extended to the tributary system as well, which could have
made prosecutors reluctant to bring tributary cases too.
For example, in a landmark pre-Rapanos prosecution involving discharge to a tributary system, a jury convicted the McWane corporation and
four individuals of years of illegal discharges to a tributary of the Black
Warrior River in violation of a permit issued by the Alabama Department
of Environmental Management. 67 Yet post-Rapanos, the Eleventh Circuit
set aside the convictions because the jury did not find a significant nexus
between the tributary and water quality in the Black Warrior River despite
their connectivity. 68 Prosecutors might reasonably steer clear of cases involving distant tributaries if they must prove a significant nexus between
the tributary and downstream water quality, 69 as that would lend itself to a
“battle of the experts” about what constitutes a significant nexus that could
raise reasonable doubts in the mind of jurors and mandate acquittals.
Yet our data from 2010-2014 shows a small increase in the number of
defendants prosecuted for discharge without a Clean Water Act permit
and only a small decrease in the number of defendants charged with discharge in violation of a Clean Water Act permit. From 2005-2010, there
were 142 defendants prosecuted for discharge without a Clean Water Act
permit, or an average of just under 24 defendants per year. From 20112014, there were 103 defendants prosecuted for discharge without a
Clean Water Act permit, or an average of 25 defendants per year. Likewise, from 2005-2010, there were 86 defendants prosecuted for discharge
in violation of a Clean Water Act permit, or an average of 14 defendants
per year. From 2011-2014, there were 53 defendants prosecuted for discharge in violation of a Clean Water Act permit, or an average of just over
13 defendants per year. In fact, although there are year-to-year variations,

67.

United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d. 1208, 1211-12 (11th Cir. 2007).

68.

Id. at 1223.

69. The Obama administration proposed a new definition of “waters of the United
States” that relied heavily on the significant nexus test but would have been relatively easy
to enforce in the tributary context because it found that all tributaries connected to navigablein-fact waters had a significant nexus to downstream water quality. See LAURA GATZ, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R45424, “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES” (WOTUS): CURRENT STATUS OF
THE 2015 CLEAN WATER RULE 2, n.13 (2018), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45424. The Trump administration has proposed a replacement rule that would
eliminate the emphasis on the significant nexus test but still would protect permanent and
intermittent tributaries, although it would remove protection for ephemeral tributaries. See
STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LSB10236, WADING INTO THE “WATERS OF
THE UNITED STATES” 2 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10236.pdf.
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the combined number of Clean Water Act no permit and discharge in violation of a permit defendants in 2005—before Rapanos was decided—is the
same as it was in 2013 (44 defendants) and only one more than it was in
2007 and 2011 (43 defendants).
Nor does it appear there are fewer Clean Water Act charges postRapanos when we analyze the number of Clean Water Act no permit
charges and discharge in violation of a permit charges as a percentage of
all defendants charged (to account for yearly variations). Clean Water Act
charges graphed as a percentage of all defendants charged are shown in
FIGURE 6 below.

We see significant year-to-year variations in the percentage of defendants charged with discharge without a Clean Water Act permit, as well
as smaller year-to-year variations in the percentage of defendants
charged with discharged in violation of a Clean Water Act permit. But over
the course of the entire dataset, there is no indication that fewer charges
were brought after Rapanos. In 2005, before the Supreme Court decided
Rapanos, 27 percent of all defendants were charged with Clean Water Act
no permit and discharge in violation of a permit, a number that dipped to
24 percent in 2006, the year the Supreme Court decided Rapanos. In subsequent years the percentages fluctuated—higher in 2007 and 2009, but
lower in 2008 and 2010 to 2012—but in 2013 and 2014 the numbers were
significantly higher (30 and 37 percent).
Further undermining the notion that prosecutors are pursing fewer
Clean Water Act cases after Rapanos is the fact that discharges without
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a Clean Water Act permit increased as a percentage of all Clean Water
Act charges (as shown in FIGURE 5). If prosecutors were reluctant to bring
Clean Water Act cases post-Rapanos, we should see decreased percentages of defendants charged with discharge without a permit and in violation of a permit relative to other Clean Water Act charges. Instead, the
percentage of Clean Water Act defendants who discharged without a permit increased (46.1 percent from 2005-2010 and 54.8 percent from 20112014), and there was no significant change in the percentage of defendants charged with discharge in violation of a permit (27.9 percent from
2005-2010 and 28.2 percent from 2011-2014).
In fact, the largest change we see in Clean Water Act cases is a substantial decrease in the percentage of defendants charged with pretreatment violations: 20.5 percent from 2005-2010 and 9.6 percent from 20112014. The large drop suggests a shift in charging emphasis away from
pretreatment cases, which involve illegal discharges into publicly-owned
treatment works (which in turn discharge treated wastewater into rivers
and streams under Clean Water Act permits). But the decrease almost
certainly does not implicate Rapanos, since most wastewater treatment
plants discharge into navigable-in-fact rivers and streams and therefore
do not involve the jurisdictional questions raised by tributary cases.
An intriguing question is what accounts for the 18.8 percent increase
in the percentage of Clean Water Act cases involving discharge without a
permit (relative to all Clean Water Act charges). The increase in “no permit” cases might be attributable to the fact that there are more defendants
from 2011-2014 operating outside the regulatory system, 70 so we will continue to monitor that relationship. But the increase is difficult to square with
the idea that prosecutors are less willing to bring Clean Water Act charges
after Rapanos. As noted above, if Rapanos were influencing prosecutors,
I would expect to see a decrease in cases involving discharge without a
permit, because of the difficulty of proving jurisdiction beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, our data shows an increase in those cases.

D. Clean Air Act Charges
The most significant increase in charges we see during 2011-2014
involves the Clean Air Act, which accounted for more than 19 percent of
all defendants charged from 2005-2010, but more than 24 percent of all
defendants prosecuted from 2011-2014. In the first six years of our data,
171 defendants (or 19.4 percent) were charged with Clean Air Act violations; in the last four years, 145 defendants (or 24.3 percent) were

70.

See infra Section III.C.
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charged. This is an increase of 25.3 percent in the number of Clean Air
Act defendants overall, as shown by year in FIGURE 7 below.

The shift is even more dramatic when we compare the first five years of
our data (124 defendants charged from 2005-2009) to the last five years
(192 defendants charged from 2010-2014). The data shows a 55 percent
increase in the number of defendants charged with Clean Air Act violations. Some of that change could be attributable to the fact that there were
more defendants charged overall during the last five years (722 defendants from 2005-2009 compared to 757 defendants from 2010-2014).
Nonetheless, the data still shows a 48 percent increase when we look at
Clean Air Act defendants as a percentage of all defendants (17.2 percent
from 2005-2009 versus 25.4 percent from 2010-2014).
Historically, criminal prosecution under the Clean Air Act has involved
illegal asbestos removal and/or demolition of buildings that contain asbestos. 71 That remained the case from 2005-2009, when 81 of the 124 defendants charged with Clean Air Act violations were involved in illegal asbestos abatement (an average of 16.2 defendants per year or 65.3
percent of all Clean Air Act defendants).72 We saw an even larger number

71.

Uhlmann, supra note 1, at 189.

72. The prosecution of W.R. Grace and its employees for knowingly endangering residents of Libby, Montana accounts for one quarter of the Clean Air Act defendants charged
during 2005. Although asbestos was the hazardous air pollutant involved in the Grace pros-
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of defendants charged with asbestos abatement crimes from 2010-2014
(103 of the 192 defendants charged with Clean Air Act violations or 20.6
defendants per year). But because there were so many more Clean Air
Act defendants overall, the percentage of asbestos abatement defendants
dropped from 65.3 percent of all Clean Air Act defendants from 2005-2009
to 53.6 percent of all Clean Air Act defendants from 2010-2014.
EPA and the Justice Department have sought to shift toward non-asbestos abatement cases for many years. 73 Our data suggests this shift in
emphasis may be occurring and is largely responsible for the increased
number of Clean Air Act prosecutions. FIGURE 8 shows the relationship
between asbestos abatement and other violations of the Clean Air Act,
graphed as a percentage of all defendants charged between 2005-2014.

Since the percentage of asbestos abatement charges is relatively
consistent over time, despite year-to-year fluctuations, we looked more
closely at other Clean Air Act crimes, which have increased significantly
in the last five years as a percentage of all defendants. The increase in

ecution, the case did not involve violation of the asbestos work practice standards that govern asbestos removal during renovation and demolition activity. We therefore do not include
the Grace defendants when calculating asbestos abatement violations; instead, we treat
Grace as a non-asbestos abatement case. See generally Superseding Indictment, United
States v. W.R. Grace, No. 9:05-cr-00007-DWM (D. Mont. June 26, 2006).
73.

Uhlmann, supra note 1, at 189.
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other Clean Air Act charges is not attributable to stationary source violations, which historically have been the focus of civil enforcement under the
Clean Air Act. From 2005-2009, there were 27 defendants (3.7 percent of
our database), charged with stationary source violations; from 2010-2014
there also were 27 defendants (3.6 percent of our database). There were
two categories of Clean Air Act violations, however, that increased significantly over time: mobile source cases and cases related to renewable
fuels (“Renewable Identification Number” or “RINs” cases). FIGURE 9
breaks down the non-asbestos abatement violations by category.

Significantly, there were no mobile source Clean Air Act charges during 2005-2006. From 2007-2014, however, there were a total of 46 mobile
source cases, which is the second largest category of Clean Air Act
charges during those eight years (after asbestos abatement violations).
With the exception of five cases, all of the Clean Air Act mobile source
cases involved falsifying emissions tests. The remaining cases involved
negligently releasing hazardous air pollutants, falsely certifying that a
trailer had been properly tested, failing to report the importation of two foreign vehicles, making fraudulent statements on gasoline certification, and
providing motor vehicle air conditioning technician training without a permit. Notably, this increase in criminal charges for violations of mobile
source requirements occurred before the diesel scandal involving
Volkswagen and Audi was revealed in 2015, suggesting that this may be
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a new area of criminal enforcement activity that did not exist until the last
several years.74
An increase also occurred in Clean Air Act charges related to the Renewable Fuel Standard Program, which began in 2005 and was expanded
in 2007. 75 Compliance with the program is measured by Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs). RINs are credits that are generated when a producer makes a gallon of renewable fuel and can be sold with renewable
fuel or traded.76 This program has led to an uptick in violations under the
Clean Air Act when defendants create false RINs and/or sell false RINs
when they have not actually created any renewable fuel. No RINS cases
were filed prior to 2011 but there was one case each year from 2011-2014,
with 8 defendants charged in those 4 cases.
It remains to be seen whether the increase in Clean Air Act prosecutions for crimes other than asbestos abatement violations will continue in
future years. Nonetheless, this is a potentially significant shift that would
better align the criminal enforcement program with the broader pollution
prevention goals of the EPA—and the significant public health benefits that
are attributable to the Clean Air Act, both in terms of saved lives and reduced health care costs. 77

74. The criminal provisions of the Clean Air Act do not extend to emissions violations
by mobile sources but do cover false statements and fraud in the mobile source context.
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1) (2012) (excluding mobile source violations) with 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413(c)(2) (covering any false statements in documents or certifications required by the
Act).
75. Overview for Renewable Fuel Standard, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/renewable-fuel-standard-program/overview-renewable-fuel-standard
(last visited Jan. 31, 2019).
76.
77.

Id.
See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, THE BENEFITS AND

COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT FROM 1990 TO 2020, 27 (Mar. 2011), https://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2015-07/documents/summaryreport.pdf (The EPA study found that the direct benefits of the Clean Air Act “significantly” outweighed the direct costs. Among their
more notable findings was that the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act would lead to air
quality improvements that would have an economic value of almost $2 trillion in direct costs
and prevent an estimated 230,000 deaths annually by the year 2020.); Alan H. Lockwood,
How the Clean Air Act Has Saved $22 Trillion in Health-Care Costs, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 7,
2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/09/how-the-clean-air-act-hassaved-22-trillion-in-health-care-costs/262071/ (“[T]he net direct benefits [of the Clean Air Act
between 1970 and 1990] were between $5.1 and $48.9 trillion, with a central estimate of
$21.7 trillion. The benefit-cost rations were 43.4:1 for the central estimate and 11:1 and
97.8:1 for the extreme estimates.”).
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E. RCRA Charges
The most significant decrease in our dataset from 2011-2014 involved
hazardous waste crimes charged under RCRA. In the first six years of our
study, prosecutors charged 120 defendants with RCRA violations or an
average of 20 defendants per year. As a result, RCRA charges were 14
percent of all charges from 2005-2010. During the last four years, however, prosecutors charged only 52 defendants with RCRA violations or an
average of 13 defendants per year. This decline in the number of RCRA
charges lowered RCRA charges to 9 percent of all charges from 20112014, a 36 percent drop.
The decrease in RCRA charges occurred across all categories of
RCRA violations. The RCRA data, broken down into types of violations is
shown in FIGURE 10, which charts each category of RCRA violations as a
percentage of all defendants charged from 2005-2014.

While there are significant decreases in all four categories of RCRA violations presented in FIGURE 10, it may be noteworthy that the decreases are
smallest for the largest category, which is treatment, storage, and disposal
violations (a 37 percent decrease). Larger decreases occurred for transporting to a facility without a permit (54 percent) and transporting without
a manifest (69 percent). There were 29 defendants charged with transporting hazardous waste to a facility without a permit from 2005-2010 and
just 9 charged from 2011-2014. Likewise, there were 29 defendants
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charged with transporting hazardous waste without a manifest from 20052010 and just 6 charged from 2011-2014.
I would expect to see downward trends overtime in the number of
RCRA charges, because the rigorous cradle-to-grave regulatory scheme
created by RCRA is now well integrated into most commercial activity. 78
Where in the early years of the environmental crimes program, illegal storage of hazardous waste and midnight dumping of hazardous waste remained common—after all, it had been lawful for decades until RCRA was
enacted in 1976—we are long past the point where businesses that generate hazardous waste are unfamiliar with RCRA rigorous waste management requirements. 79
That said, the decline in RCRA charges over the ten years covered by
our dataset may not be as significant as initially appears to be the case.
The six-year average of 20 defendants per year was significantly inflated
by one outlier year when 37 defendants were charged with RCRA crimes
(2007), more than twice the next highest amount (18 defendants in 2010).
The average number of RCRA defendants during the other five years was
nearly 17 defendants, still higher than the average of 13 defendants from
2011-2014 but not by anywhere near as large an amount. Moreover, the
lower four-year average from 2011-2014 also reflects the impact of an outlier year in the other direction, when only 4 defendants were charged with
RCRA crimes (2014), less than one third of the next lowest year (2013).
The average number of RCRA defendants the other three years was 16
defendants, close to the average for 2005-2010 when 2007 is removed.
The net result is that RCRA defendants clearly declined over the 10
years covered by our study but that declined was magnified by two outlier
years when far more RCRA violations were charged (2007) and when far
fewer defendants were charged (2014). Outliers, of course, are part of any
data and could be explained by other factors. For example, the low year
in 2014, when only 4 RCRA defendants were charged, also involved by

78. See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, RCRA’S CRITICAL MISSION & THE PATH
FORWARD
(June
2014),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-09/documents/rcras_critical_mission_and_the_path_forward.pdf (“Large and small business have
responded [to RCRA] by investing capital, hiring top talent and building and developing the
nation’s materials handling and waste management infrastructure to be among the best in
the world”); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AUTHORIZATION STATUS OF ALL RESOURCE
CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT (RCRA) AND HAZARDOUS AND SOLID WASTE AMENDMENTS
(HSWA) RULES (last updated Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-12/documents/authorization_status_of_all_rules_september_2018.pdf (containing 339 pages of rules adopted and authorized by individual states).
79. EPA hosts Compliance Assistance Centers that offer “easy access to plain-language materials” to “help businesses . . . comply with environmental requirements.” Compliance Assistance Centers, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/compliance/compliance-assistance-centers (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
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far the fewest charges overall of any of the 10 years covered by our study
(107 defendants). But the numbers were still very low that year—less than
4 percent of all charges—and the next two lowest numbers of RCRA defendants also were in the last four years. In 2011, there were 14 RCRA
defendants even though 191 defendants were charged with environmental crimes that year (7.3 percent of all defendants), and in 2013, there were
only 13 RCRA defendants (8.6 percent of all defendants charged that
year).
We will monitor the RCRA data as we analyze the 2015-2018 data
that we have received from EPA to determine whether the decline that
emerged over the last four years continues and makes RCRA charges
less frequent than historically has been the case.

III. AGGRAVATING FACTORS IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROSECUTIONS
The central finding of our original study was that 96 percent of all defendants charged with environmental crime committed violations that involved at least one of the aggravating factors I had identified in my prior
scholarship. 80 On that basis, I determined that prosecutors were exercising their discretion to limit criminal charges to conduct involving those aggravating factors—and that violations that did not involve aggravating factors were unlikely to result in criminal charges. 81 I suggested that these
findings might help ameliorate over-criminalization concerns regarding
environmental criminal enforcement, and similarly reduce claims that
prosecutorial discretion was randomly exercised. 82
Our updated data produced even more compelling results on the core
question of whether aggravating factors are present: 98.7 percent of all
defendants charged between 2005 and 2014 committed violations that involved at least one aggravating factor. The biggest shift occurred in the
percentage of defendants who operated outside the regulatory system,
which was nearly 40 percent higher from 2011-2014. Repetitiveness and
deceptive or misleading conduct remained the most prevalent aggravating
factors, with the numbers higher for repetitiveness and somewhat lower
for deceptive and misleading conduct. The percentage of defendants who
committed violations that caused harm increased slightly. Overall, our updated data even more robustly supports the conclusion that prosecutors
reserve criminal prosecution for violations that involve aggravating factors—and that defendants who commit violations that do not involve aggravating factors are unlikely to face criminal charges.

80.

Uhlmann, supra note 1, at 165.

81.

Id. at 194.
Id. at 194-95.

82.
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FIGURE 11 presents aggravating factor analysis for all defendants
charged with environmental crimes between 2005-2014.

I will review shifts within each aggravating factor in the discussion that
follows in this Part.

A. Significant Environmental Harm/Public Health Effects
Environmental harm and public health effects remains a critical aggravating factor in criminal prosecutions, accounting for slightly more than
one in six defendants. The percentage of defendants who caused environmental harm increased over the last four years, from 19.9 percent for
2011-2014 compared to 17.9 percent from 2005-2010). 83
As I have suggested previously, harm may be the most misunderstood—and most distorting—aggravating factor in criminal cases. 84 On the

83. Our updated data identifies more 2005-2010 defendants causing environmental
harm or public health impacts than my original article. First, we added 21 new defendants to
the database who were charged between 2005-2010, as pending cases were completed,
several of whom committed violations involving harm. Second, we removed subjectivity
about when we code for animal deaths/ecological harm. We now treat any animal deaths as
environmental harm rather than making a subjective determination based on the amount of
animal deaths or type of harm. For comparison, the original article reported 144 harm cases
or 17 percent of defendants charged from 2005-2010; we now have 158 harm cases or 18
percent.
84.

Uhlmann, supra note 4, at 1247.
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one hand, it is easiest to justify criminal prosecution in cases where harm
occurs, since the impact of the violations is clear to judges and juries. During my seventeen years at the Justice Department, a criminal investigation
ensued in every case involving significant environmental harm, particularly those where the harm was catastrophic (i.e. Exxon Valdez, Olympic
Pipeline, and BP Texas City)—and, in most instances criminal charges followed those criminal investigations. On the other hand, harm cases can
result in opportunistic prosecution, with criminal charges brought because
of the extent of the harm, not because of the egregiousness of the underlying misconduct.
To be clear, harm is a relevant consideration in determining whether
a case that involves misconduct warrants federal prosecution. In the Principles of Federal Prosecution, the Justice Department identifies harm as
one of the factors that determines the seriousness of a violation and
whether federal prosecution resources should be used to address the violation. 85 But I remain concerned that, when significant harm occurs, the
rigorous analysis we should demand from prosecutors—focused on legal
elements, potential defenses, and the reasonable exercise of prosecutorial discretion—will yield to the passions of the moment in the community
harmed. No one asks why criminal charges are brought when significant
harm occurs; to the contrary, the public often demands criminal charges
in those cases, even when the harm was purely accidental. In those circumstances, there is a risk that prosecutorial over-reaching will occur.
As I have noted previously, the Gulf oil spill provides a classic example of the challenge provided by harm cases.86 Prosecutors charged BP
with negligent violations of the Clean Water Act for the risky conduct that
caused the catastrophic spill. Given the magnitude of the harm, the degree
of BP’s negligence, and the company’s history of criminal violations of the
environmental laws, 87 it was appropriate to hold BP accountable for its

85. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FED. PROSECUTION OF BUS. ORGS. § 928.200(B) (2015), https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecutionbusiness-organizations. See also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Q1.2 cmt. n.5
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelinesmanual/2018/GLMFull.pdf);
86. See generally David M. Uhlmann, After the Spill is Gone: The Gulf of Mexico, Environmental Crime, and the Criminal Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1413 (2011) (explaining why
criminal prosecution of BP would be appropriate for the negligence that caused the Gulf oil
spill).
87. See BP Found ‘Grossly Negligent’ in 2010 Gulf Oil Spill, BBC NEWS, (Sept. 4,
2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-29069184; Richard Mauer & Anna M. Tinsley,
Gulf Oil Spill: BP Has a Long Record of Legal, Ethical Violations, THE HERALD,
https://www.heraldonline.com/latest-news/article12253727.html (last updated Sept. 18,
2013, 05:58 PM).
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negligence and a corporate culture that devalued environmental compliance and worker safety.
But prosecutors may have over-reached when they also brought manslaughter and Clean Water Act negligence charges against the BP wellsite leaders who were onboard the Deepwater Horizon when the Macondo
blowout occurred, and eleven crew members died. 88 Those charges were
an attempt to find individuals to blame in the absence of a compelling legal
theory for manslaughter—and without sufficient evidence of individual negligence. The Justice Department dismissed the manslaughter charges after the Fifth Circuit ruled that they were required to prove gross negligence
to support manslaughter charges.89 One of the well-site leaders pleaded
guilty to Clean Water Act negligence (simple negligence) but the other
went to trial and was acquitted in less than two hours. 90
Perhaps the system worked in the Gulf oil spill case: corporate liability
was imposed, and the jury was able to see past the harm and determine
whether the individual defendants acted with negligence. In cases involving significant harm, prosecutors often suggest that the case should be
charged so that a jury can decide whether to impose criminal liability. But
the case demonstrates the danger of a reflexive prosecutorial response in
harm cases. In cases involving individuals who cannot afford the cost of
going to trial—or corporate defendants who cannot afford the uncertainty
of protracted litigation—prosecutors may be successful in harm cases even
though fairness demands a different course of action.
We see a more than 11 percent increase in harm data when we compare the last four years of our data (2011-2014) to the previous six years.
There are notable increases in all categories, except significant cost of
cleanup, which dropped by 15.3 percent. Taken together, these shifts ac-

88. See David M. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings: Reconsidering Corporate Criminal Prosecution, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1277-78 (2016).
89. Ronald A. Sarachan & Tracy S. Combs, Why Key Deepwater Horizon Criminal
Charges Were Dismissed, LAW360 (Dec. 13, 2013), https://www.law360.com/articles/495626/why-key-deepwater-horizon-criminal-charges-were-dismissed (explaining that
a judge in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed the 11 counts of
seaman’s manslaughter charges against the defendants; the only remaining manslaughter
charges were for involuntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. § 1112, which has a higher gross
negligence standard); Letitia Stein, BP Spill Manslaughter Charges Dropped, One Guilty of
Environmental Crime, REUTERS (Dec. 2, 2015) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bp-spillcharges-idUSKBN0TL26L20151202 (stating that the District Court’s opinion dismissing the
seaman’s manslaughter charges was upheld in the 5th Circuit and that federal prosecutors
later dropped the charges of involuntary manslaughter).
90. BP Engineer Is Not Guilty in Case From 2010 Gulf Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/26/business/energy-environment/bp-engineer-isnot-guilty-in-case-from-2010-gulf-oil-spill.html.

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2019
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396643

39

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 163 [2019]

140

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

[Vol. X:N

count for the increase in the number of cases where harm was an aggravating factor. The harm data by category of harm is presented in FIGURE
12, showing each category of harm as a percentage of all defendants who
caused environmental or public health harm.

Prosecutors appear to be bringing charges more often in cases where
serious bodily injury or death occurs (an increase of more than 40 percent
over the last four years). But that increase is largely attributable to a surge
during 2012 when 10 defendants were charged in cases involving death
or serious bodily injury (compared to none during 2010-2011 and 4 from
2013-2014). The more significant development may be the increase in the
number of defendants charged in cases where prosecutors charged at
least one defendant with endangerment.91 This increase is particularly
dramatic when we compare the first five years of data with the second five
years. Prosecutors charged 26 defendants in cases involving endangerment from 2005-2009, compared to 49 defendants from 2010-2014. The

91. As explained in the methodology discussion in Part I, we code for aggravating
factors consistently for all defendants in each case, except where the conduct is wholly separate from the core misconduct (i.e. in a case where one defendant, acting alone, commits
perjury). Therefore, if prosecutors charge any defendants in a case with endangerment, we
coded all defendants in that case for endangerment. We do so because harm is an aggravating factor in cases where endangerment occurs regardless of whether all defendants are
charged with endangerment. As a result, the number of defendants charged in cases where
endangerment is an aggravating factor will exceed the number of defendants who prosecutors charged with knowing or negligent endangerment.
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highest totals occurred in 2013 (16 defendants) and 2010 (12 defendants)—and the fourth and fifth highest totals were in 2011 and 2012 (8 and
9 respectively). The increase appears attributable, however, to the number of defendants charged in those cases; with the exception of 2013, the
number of endangerment cases is relatively consistent. The number of
endangerment cases/defendants are shown in FIGURE 13 below.

We examined the defendants charged with endangerment—a narrower category than all defendants charged in cases where endangerment was an aggravating factor—to assess what may have led to the increased presence of an endangerment as an aggravating factor. The
number of defendants charged with endangerment also increases over
the second five years of our dataset, although not quite as dramatically.
From 2005-2009, prosecutors charged 22 defendants with endangerment;
from 2010-2014, prosecutors charged 32 defendants with endangerment.
Of course, the total number of defendants charged with endangerment (54
defendants) is a small percentage of all defendants (3.6 percent). But the
increase in endangerment charges may be a noteworthy shift nonetheless. Nearly three quarters of the endangerment charges were brought
under the Clean Air Act negligent endangerment provisions (40 out of 54
defendants). The Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and RCRA all have
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knowing endangerment provisions, but only the Clean Air Act has a negligent endangerment provision. 92 Indeed, most endangerment charges
are brought under the Clean Air Act: only 4 defendants were charged with
endangerment under RCRA, and no defendants were charged with endangerment under the Clean Water Act. 93

B. Deceptive or Misleading Conduct
Deceptive or misleading conduct remains the heart of criminal enforcement under the environmental laws. The continued reliance on Title
18 in the charging of environmental violations, particularly to the extent
that it involves false statements, obstruction of justice, and fraud, reflects
a prosecutorial emphasis on charging crimes involving “lying, cheating,
and stealing.” Indeed, 62 percent of all defendants charged from 20052014 engaged in deceptive or misleading conduct, making this the most
prevalent of the three aggravating factors that focus on the substantive
nature of the underlying violation (in contrast to the duration of the violation).
We did see a small drop in the percentage of defendants engaged in
deceptive or misleading conduct over the last four years. From 20052010, just under 63 percent of all defendants engaged in deceptive or misleading conduct; from 2011- 2014, just under 61 percent of all defendants
engaged in deceptive or misleading conduct. A two percent drop is small
given the percentage of defendants engaging in deceptive or misleading
conduct—but it would be more significant if it persisted over time.
We also coded for whether deceptive or misleading conduct occurs
during the commission of the offense, reporting and/or recordkeeping, or
during the investigation. The percentage of defendants engaging in deceptive or misleading conduct during the commission of the offense and
for reporting/recordkeeping violations remained the same; the percentage
decreased somewhat for cover-up activity, which appears to account for
the overall decrease in deceptive or misleading conduct defendants.
The subcategories of deceptive or misleading conduct as a percentage of all defendants are shown in FIGURE 14.

92. Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Criminal Enforcement of Pollution Control Laws, 9 ENVTL.
LAW. 1, 43 (2002); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(4) (2012).
93. The lack of Clean Water Act charges is not surprising, because discharges into
navigable waters and their tributaries are unlikely to endanger people. Moreover, in the
sewer system context, there is caselaw holding (I think incorrectly) that knowing endangerment cannot be charged based on dangers that occur before the pollution reaches the publicly-owned treatment works, which effectively eliminates protections for employees of the
company engaged in the illegal discharge. United States v. Borowski, 977 F.2d 27, 32 (1st
Cir. 1992).
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Interestingly, while the percentage of defendants who engaged in deceptive or misleading conduct is slightly lower from 2011-2014, the percentage who engaged in multiple forms of deceptive or misleading conduct is
somewhat higher. During the first six years of our data, 46 percent engaged in multiple types of deceptive or misleading conduct; during the last
four years, 52 percent of defendants engaged in multiple types of deceptive or misleading conduct, an increase of 12.4 percent. As was the case
for the first six years, the most common relationship was commission and
reporting or recordkeeping, which increased from 21.1 percent of all defendants to 22.7 percent of all defendants. Meanwhile, the percentage of
defendants who engaged in conduct that involved all three subcategories
dropped from 16.4 percent to 14.1 percent (15.5 percent for all ten years).
The environmental laws create an honor system whereby companies
are expected to self-identify regarding their pollution activities and honestly report their compliance with environmental obligations. When companies mislead the government about their compliance efforts, regulatory
officials make decisions about what pollution to allow with an inaccurate
picture of what pollution is occurring, and the regulatory system, designed
to protect public health and the environment, is compromised. For that
reason, as I have argued previously, deceptive or misleading conduct inculpates both because of the harm it can cause to public health and the
environment, and because all companies and their employees have an
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obligation to be truthful about compliance. 94 Other than repetitiveness, I
would expect charges involving deceptive or misleading conduct to continue to be the largest number of defendants in the future.

C. Operating Outside the Regulatory System
The modest downward shift in deceptive or misleading conduct between 2011-2014 was accompanied by a major upward shift in operating
outside the regulatory system. From 2011-2014, 44 percent of all defendants engaged in conduct that involved operating outside the regulatory
system, compared to 32 percent during the previous six years. This nearly
40 percent increase in defendants operating outside the regulatory system
over the last four years covered by our data is the single biggest aggravating factor trend that the new data shows. Indeed, over the last four
years of our dataset, there were almost as many defendants operating
outside the regulatory system (262 defendants) as there were the first six
years (281 defendants). Moreover, a higher percentage of defendants
were charged with violations involving operating outside the regulatory
system in each of the last four years than in any of the previous six years,
as shown in FIGURE 15.

94.

Uhlmann, supra note 1, at 197-99.
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It is noteworthy that this shift occurred even though we became more restrictive about when we coded for operating outside the regulatory system. 95
Our data shows an increase in each of the four subcategories of operating outside the regulatory system (failure to acquire permits, failure to
monitor, failure to maintain records, and failure to report), which together
account for the overall increase in defendants operating outside the regulatory system. FIGURE 16 provides the breakdown of our updated operating outside the regulatory system analysis, showing each subcategory of
operating outside the regulatory system as a percentage of all defendants.

As in the past, by far the largest subcategory of operating outside the
regulatory system remains failure to acquire or maintain permits, which
increased by about 8 percent during the last four years of our dataset (from
27.8 percent to 30.0 percent). Far larger percentage increases occurred,
however, in each of the other three subcategories. Failure to keep or maintain records increased by nearly 37 percent (from 4.5 percent to 6.2 percent). Failure to report increased by slightly more than 38 percent (from

95. In my earlier article, I reported that 33 percent of all defendants were operating
outside the regulatory system. Id. at 194. As noted in Part One, however, we modified how
we coded for this aggravating factor so that we no longer treat as operating outside the regulatory system defendants who nominally participated in the regulatory system, as this introduced too much subjectivity. See supra Section I.C. This modification lowered the percentage of defendants operating outside the regulatory system to 31.9 percent.
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8.6 percent to 11.9 percent). But the biggest increase of all was failure to
monitor, which increase by almost 400 percent (from 1.6 percent to 7.5
percent).
I have argued that failure to keep or maintain records and failure to
monitor is rarely conduct that by itself should result in criminal charges. 96
On that basis, I have some concern about the surge in failure to monitor
charges against defendants who were operating outside of the regulatory
system, from just 14 defendants between 2005 and 2010 (2.33 defendants
per year over a six-year period), to 45 defendants between 2011 and 2014
(11.25 defendants per year over a four-year period). The shift may be tied
to increased use of failure to monitor charges in asbestos and vessel pollution cases, where failure to monitor had not been emphasized previously
and which may involve a reasonable exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
As a general rule, however, recordkeeping or monitoring violations—without more—might be more appropriate for civil or administrative enforcement than criminal charges.
In future years, we will track whether the increase in defendants operating outside the regulatory system continues and whether the more modest decreases we see in defendants engaging in deceptive or misleading
conduct also continues. If both occur, it is possible that there is an underlying behavioral shift emerging: rather than participating in the regulatory
system, but failing to be honest about compliance, some companies may
be trying to evade regulation altogether. At this point, our data does not
indicate that there is an inverse relationship between deceptive and misleading conduct and operating outside the regulatory system. 97 Indeed,
there are a large number of defendants (218) who engaged in misconduct
involving both aggravating factors, which is a little under 15 percent of all
defendants. But there may be some relationship, since each factor is present far more often independently than together. Viewed in this light, deceptive or misleading conduct and operating outside the regulatory system may involve different paths to the same result, inasmuch as both
undermine effective public health and environmental protection.

D. Repetitive Violations
From 2005-2010, 81 percent of defendants engaged in misconduct
that was repetitive, with most of that percentage violations that lasted

96.

Uhlmann, supra note 1, at 200.

97. To test this relationship, we ran a regression analysis that showed moderate correlation between these factors. The statistical significance of that correlation, however, was
limited, and there was a great deal of variation in the data.
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more than one month.98 From 2011-2014, the percentage increased to 85
percent. FIGURE 17 provides a breakdown of repetitive violations, as a percentage of all defendants, graphed by the number of days of the alleged
misconduct.

The biggest shift we see in this data is an increase of 29 percent in the
number of defendants who engaged in misconduct that lasted between
one month and one year. At the same time, we see a 13 percent decrease
in the number of defendants who engaged in conduct that lasted more
than one year and a 20 percent decrease in single day violations.
I include repetitiveness as an aggravating factor because duration indicates greater culpability in two ways. 99 First, duration makes it more
likely that the underlying conduct was intentional and not the result of mistake or accident (thus satisfying the “knowingly” mental state requirements
for felony violations of the environmental laws). Second, duration increases the public health and environmental risk associated with a violation by lengthening the exposure period for violations of the environmental
laws.

98. Here, too, a modification in how we coded for repetitive conduct shifted our data
slightly. See supra Section I.C. In my earlier article, I found that 78.7 percent of all defendants
engaged in repetitive conduct from 2005-10. Uhlmann, supra note 1, at 193. The changes in
how we coded for repetitive conduct increased that figure to 81.2 percent.
99.

Uhlmann, supra note 4, at 1250.
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On the other hand, even isolated misconduct can be egregious if it
involves other aggravating factors. A single day of environmental violations can cause considerable harm, such as when an explosion occurs
because of a failure to maintain a safe working place in violation of the
Clean Air Act. A false statement in an oil record book can conceal months
or even years of illegal discharges from a foreign-flagged ship.100
A closer look at the defendants who were not charged with repetitive
misconduct reveals that the presence of other aggravating factors largely
tracks their presence in the dataset as a whole. In other words, the largest
category of defendants whose conduct was not repetitive are those who
engaged in deceptive or misleading conduct, followed by operating outside the regulatory system, and then by environmental harm. Over the last
four years, however, slightly more isolated misconduct defendants operated outside the regulatory system, moving it just barely ahead of deceptive or misleading conduct.
FIGURE 18 below shows single day of misconduct charges as percentages of all defendants, which captures the modest shifts that occurred
over the last four years.

100. See generally Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, Pub. L. No. 96-478, § 9(a)–(b),
94 Stat. 2301, 2301 (1980) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C § 1908(a)–(b) (2018) (recognizing implicitly that a false statement in a foreign-flagged vessel’s record book carries with
it the potential to conceal months to years of illegal discharge, in requiring criminal penalties
to be assessed by a U.S. Court, or, in cases assessing civil penalties, the Secretary of Homeland Security and EPA Administrator, with the understanding that “[e]ach day of a continuing
violation shall constitute a separate violation,” by “tak[ing] into account the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the prohibited acts committed and, with respect to the violator,
the degree of culpability, any history of prior offenses, ability to pay, and other matters as
justice may require.”).
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I have some concern about the increase in the number of defendants
charged with a single day of misconduct where the aggravating factor is
operating outside the regulatory system. Those could be cases that are
appropriate for criminal prosecution. But the negative impact that is possible from a single day of harm or deceptive/misleading conduct may not
be present from a single day of operating outside the regulatory system
(in the absence of harm or deceptive/misleading conduct). Isolated incidents of misconduct involving operating outside the regulatory system,
without more, may be better addressed by civil or administrative enforcement—and it is easier to justify criminal enforcement when misconduct occurs repeatedly, particularly if the misconduct involves other aggravating
factors in addition to operating outside the regulatory system.

IV. CASES WITH MULTIPLE AGGRAVATING FACTORS AND NO
FACTORS
Another significant aspect of our original study involved the presence
of multiple aggravating factors and the relationship between aggravating
factors. Two or more aggravating factors were present for 74 percent of
all defendants, suggesting a higher level of egregiousness than when one
factor (or no factors) were present. When we analyzed that data further,
we were able to make three additional findings.
First, 88 percent of the defendants committed violations involving one
of the first three aggravating factors (i.e. significant harm, deceptive or
misleading conduct, or operating outside the regulatory system). Second,
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while repetitiveness was the most prevalent aggravating factor (79 percent of all defendants), it was rarely the sole aggravating factor (10 percent of defendants engaged solely in repetitive violations). Third, 71 percent of the defendants committed violations that involved one of the first
three aggravating factors and repetitiveness. 101
Based on this data from the original study, I concluded that prosecutors were focusing on conduct involving one of the first three factors. I also
concluded that, while prosecutors preferred to charge repetitive violations,
repetitiveness alone might not be driving charging decisions. As a result,
a high percentage of criminal charges involved both one of the first three
aggravating factors and repetitiveness. The converse also was true: prosecutors rarely charged violations that did not involve one of the first three
aggravating factors (only 12 percent of all defendants) and avoided criminal charges based on isolated violations (only 21 percent of all defendants). 102
In this Part, I update our findings regarding the presence of multiple
aggravating factors and analyze cases where no aggravating factors were
present.

A. Multiple Aggravating Factors
We replicated the core findings from the first six years of data (20052010) when we expanded our study to include ten years of data (20052014). We found that 76.5 percent of defendants charged from 2005-2014
committed violations with two or more aggravating factors present (compared to 75.7 percent from 2005-2010). 103 The number of defendants who
committed two aggravating factors dropped by 10 percent. But that decrease was more than offset by a more than 20 percent increase in the
number of defendants with three or more aggravating factors and a nearly
200 percent increase in the number of defendants with all four aggravating
factors. Our findings on the number of aggravating factors are presented
in FIGURE 19 below.

101.

Uhlmann, supra note 1, at 205.

102. Id.
103.
This percentage and those contained in the next paragraph differ slightly from
what I reported in my original article because we continue to update our data to add newlycompleted cases. See supra note 24.
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As noted in Part III, our aggravating factor findings are even more robust
than they were for the first six years of data in terms of how often at least
one aggravating factor is present. But the data also is more robust in terms
of how often three or four aggravating factors are present (27 percent of
all defendants compared to 19 percent for 2005-2010). Moreover, the
presence of multiple aggravating factors becomes more consistent over
the last six years of our data (i.e. there is less year-to-year variability).
We also analyzed the relationship between aggravating factors. The
data revealed that 89.0 percent of defendants charged from 2005-2014
committed violations involving one of the first three aggravating factors
(compared to 90.1 percent for 2005-2010). The data showed that 74.4
percent of the defendants charged from 2005-2014 committed violations
involving one of the first three factors and repetitiveness (compared to
73.4 percent from 2005-2010) and that repetitiveness was the sole aggravating factor only 8.1 percent of the time (compared to 7.8 percent from
2005-2010).
Our findings on the relationship between aggravating factors for multifactor defendants are shown in FIGURE 20.
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The relationship between harm and repetitiveness remains relatively consistent, as does the relationship between deceptive conduct and repetitiveness. The major new development is the surge in the percentage of
defendants operating outside the regulatory system who engaged in repetitive misconduct, an increase of nearly 45 percent over the last four
years of our study. This increase largely tracks the increase in the dataset
as a whole with regard to operating outside the regulatory system, but it is
a favorable one, particularly since isolated acts of operating outside the
regulatory system might not be as egregious as isolated acts of harm or
deceptive conduct.104

B. No-Factor Cases
In my 2014 article, I reported that none of the four aggravating factors
was present for 36 defendants in our database. 105 In reviewing those
charges since the publication of the 2014 article, we have determined that
there were only 26 defendants charged between 2005-2010 (an average
of 4.3 per year) whose conduct did not involve any of the aggravating factors. There were 8 defendants that were considered “no-factor” defendants that should have been coded as either operating outside the regulatory system or engaging in repetitive misconduct (or both). In addition,

104.
105.

See supra Section III.D.
Uhlmann, supra note 1, at 213.
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because of minor methodology changes, we identified at least one aggravating factor for 2 defendants previously coded as “no-factor” defendants,
and we removed one “no-factor” defendant from the dataset. 106 We also
concluded that one defendant, who we should have coded as a “no-factor”
defendant, was improperly coded as having an aggravating factor present.
We see slightly fewer no-factor defendants annually when we expand
the dataset to include 2011-2014, with 8 additional no-factor defendants
(an average of 2 per year) for a total of 34 across the entire dataset. As
before, we have examined each no-factor defendant to determine
whether, based on the conduct described in the court documents, any of
the charges raise questions about how prosecutors exercised their discretion.
For the 34 defendants with no aggravating factors, 5 defendants committed violations that, while insufficient to code as “operating outside the
regulatory system,” nonetheless involved core subcategory violations
such as failing to obtain a permit (4 defendants) and failure to report (1
defendant). This conduct still might be sufficiently egregious to warrant
criminal prosecution, even if it does not involve operating outside the regulatory system. For example, one defendant owned and operated a septic
pumping truck and was engaged in the septic waste disposal business.
He was hired to haul waste including sludge, sewage, and chemicals to a
permitted Publicly Owned Treatment Work for proper disposal, but instead
discharged the waste directly into the sewer system without proper treatment. 107
On the other hand, two other defendants obtained permits from state
regulators allowing them to apply wastewater in approved amounts on

106. Because of the clarification in the methodology with respect to animal deaths, one
defendant that was previously found to have no factors present is now coded as environmental or public health harm. See supra note 33. Further, with respect to asbestos removal
cases, while being a licensed asbestos remover is not the same as acquiring a permit, we
determined that obtaining a license or notifying a government agency can be a proxy for selfidentification within a system that depends on self-identification. Therefore, when a defendant involved in improper asbestos removal is neither licensed nor provides proper notice to
a government agency, the defendant is acting outside the regulatory system. As a result, 1
defendant that was previously considered “no-factor” is now coded as operating outside the
regulatory system. Finally, 1 defendant that was included in the previous article has since
been removed from the data set as the case involved harm to public lands. This type of case
is typically investigated by the Bureau of Land Management law enforcement, not EPA.
These cases are outside the scope of this project unless they are paired with pollution
crimes.
107. Information at 1, United States v. Molina, No. 1:10-cr-20702-PCH (S.D. Fla. Sept.
22, 2010); Summary of Criminal Prosecutions, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/criminal_prosecution/index.cfm?action=3&prosecution_summary_id=2127 (last visited Apr. 12, 2019).
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land surfaces.108 They were charged criminally with negligently exceeding
those permit limits on one occasion. Perhaps the conduct resulted in harm
that is not reflected in the pleadings. Or perhaps they pleaded only to a
single instance of misconduct despite repetitive misconduct. But based on
the information contained in the pleadings, these would appear to be
cases that might have been more appropriate for civil or administrative
enforcement.109
Of the remaining 29 defendants with no aggravating factors and no
sub-categories of operating outside the regulatory system, 7 defendants
engaged in conduct that was egregious in other ways so that criminal
charges may have been appropriate despite the absence of aggravating
factors. For example, one defendant’s negligence caused a school bus to
be sprayed with pesticides; he was charged with criminal violations of
FIFRA for misapplying pesticides. In another case, a defendant siphoned
diesel from a railcar that resulted in the discharge of several thousand
gallons of diesel fuel into a creek and required the removal of 80 tons of
soil from the creek bed. Neither of these cases would have been coded as
harm cases under the criteria we use in the Environmental Crimes Project,
yet both involved significant risk and impacts that might warrant criminal
charges.
Only 22 defendants engaged in conduct where prosecution could not
be justified by a subcategory or additional aggravating factor. Of that number, 7 defendants were charged in an indictment or information that merely
recited the elements of the offense. For those defendants, it is not possible
to reach any conclusions based on the court documents about whether
criminal charges were appropriate. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, indictments that recite the elements of the offense are legally
sufficient. It is far easier to identify aggravating factors in so-called speaking indictments, however, where prosecutors provide additional details
about the misconduct, including the type of evidence that fits within the
aggravating factor analysis. In the absence of speaking indictments, we
looked to other documents to determine whether aggravating factors were
present (e.g. plea agreements, factual basis statements, sentencing
memoranda, judgments, and press releases), but those documents sometimes did not exist or did not provide additional information beyond the
charges.

108. Indictment at 2-5, United States v. Ohio Fresh Eggs, LLC, No. 3:09-mj-07047-VKA
(N.D. Ohio Apr. 16, 2009).
109.
In my previous article, I also expressed concern about the fact that the Ohio
Fresh Eggs prosecution appeared to involve negligent misconduct on a single day, while
acknowledging (as I do here) that there may have been more misconduct than is reflected
in available court documents. Uhlmann, supra note 1, at 187.
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That leaves us with 15 defendants for whom we could not discern a
rationale for the prosecution despite the availability of court documents
that provided details about their misconduct. Five of those defendants
were charged with FIFRA violations involving the use of pesticides in an
unregistered manner. The underlying conduct was intentional and may
have warranted criminal prosecution, but it is fair to question whether civil
or administrative enforcement would have been sufficient in these misdemeanor cases.
Ten more defendants engaged in conduct on a single day according
to the charging documents, without the presence of any aggravating factor
that might make those cases egregious. In 9 of the 10 cases, the misconduct involved negligence. These 10 defendants engaged in the following
misconduct, none of which seems particularly egregious:110
• An employee negligently left a water hose running overnight
near a neutralization pit, which overflowed into a nearby
creek;
• After an accidental spill into a cement pit, the defendant attempted to treat the resulting waste material and dispose into
the sewer system; he immediately stopped when notified by
the POTW that his conduct was not permissible;
• A defendant drove a truck across a berm, resulting in the negligent release of contaminated wastewater from a fracking operation into a creek;
• A defendant negligently discharged contaminated
wastewater into the Mississippi River without a permit on a
single day;
• A defendant negligently discharged aluminum silicate into the
Boise River on a single day;
• A sump pump was negligently maintained on an offshore oil
production platform causing an oil discharge;
• A defendant negligently discharged pollutants into the East
Gallatin River without a permit on a single day;
• 2 defendants negligently discharged treated wastewater in violation of their permit on a single day; and
• A defendant improperly disposed of sludge on agricultural
land in violation of a permit.
While these cases may have been egregious in ways that are not clear
from the court documents, in which case criminal charges may have been
appropriate, these are cases that might have been appropriate for civil or
administrative enforcement.
110. Excel Document, David M. Uhlmann, Data Download from ECP Database (Spring
2019) (on file with the author).
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A summary of the no-factor cases is shown below in FIGURE 21.

As in the first six years of our study, the percentage of no-factor cases is
low—now just three percent—so the conclusion still holds that prosecutors
focus on conduct that involves aggravating factors in nearly every case.
In addition, as the discussion above suggests, there may be cases that
are egregious in ways that are not captured by my aggravating factors or
where the court documents do not provide enough information to conduct
aggravating factor analysis. But prosecutors should be mindful of cases
that do not involve aggravating factors and ensure that there is a compelling rationale for criminal prosecution before charging those violations.
While the percentage of no-factors cases may be small, any instance of
prosecutorial overreaching is problematic—and far worse for the defendants who are charged simply because the environmental laws allow criminal prosecution even for violations that are not egregious.

V. INDIVIDUAL OUTCOME DATA FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME
In my prior articles about the Environmental Crimes Project data, I
have focused on statutes charged and the presence of aggravating factors, as those reflect most directly on how prosecutors are exercising their
discretion in the environmental context. Since prosecutorial discretion
plays such a significant role in determining when environmental violations
are criminal, data regarding what types of misconduct most often result in
criminal charges as well as the extent to which aggravating factors are
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present help define what otherwise might present as a random or amorphous area of prosecution activity.
As the Supreme Court noted in United States v. Dotterweich, 111 however, prosecutors do no exercise discretion in a vacuum: judges and juries
determine whether charged conduct will result in a conviction and, when
a conviction occurs, whether incarcerated will result. In this Part, I consider data regarding conviction rates and incarceration rates for individuals charged with environmental crime.

A. Conviction Rates for Environmental Crime
From 2005-2014, the Justice Department charged 1,060 individuals
with environmental crime as we define the term for the Environmental
Crimes Project. Of that number, we have outcome information for 1,050
(charges remain pending for 10 defendants). For the completed cases,
902 defendants pleaded guilty, and 85 defendants were found guilty at
trial, resulting in 987 convictions and a conviction rate of 94.0 percent.
Charges were dismissed against 45 defendants, yielding a dismissal rate
of 4.06 percent; 20 individuals were acquitted, yielding an acquittal rate of
1.89 percent.
The 94.0 percent conviction rate for individuals charged with environmental crime exceeds the 91.1 percent conviction rate in the federal criminal justice system during 2014, the last year covered by our study.112 The
conviction rate for environmental crimes is also higher than the 88.4 percent conviction rate for regulatory offenses. 113 The higher conviction rates
for individuals charged with environmental crime, however, did not always
carry over to trial, as shown in FIGURE 22.

111.

See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279, 284 (1943).

112.

MARK MOTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 250183, FEDERAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 2014, at 17 (Mar. 2017), http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=5873.
113. Id. The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) defines regulatory offenses as “a violation of regulatory laws and regulations in agriculture, antitrust, labor law, food and drug, motor carrier, and other regulatory offenses that are not specifically listed in the category public
order offenses, nonregulatory.” Id. at 51. BJS lists environmental crimes separately and reports a 94.1 percent conviction rate but in a smaller number of cases (34 cases for FY 2014
compared to 65 cases in our dataset for calendar year 2014). Id. at 17. I suspect the difference reflects the fact that BJS uses a narrower definition of environmental violations that
includes only cases charged under the environmental statutes.
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The conviction rate was lower as a percentage of all individuals who went
to trial—80.8 percent—with the acquittal rate for individuals who went to trial
correspondingly higher—19.2 percent. That places the conviction rate at
trial lower than what available data shows for the federal system generally
(84.0 percent) and for regulatory offenses (83.1 percent). 114
Overall individual conviction rates remained relatively consistent over
the ten years of our dataset, ranging from a high of 99.1 percent and 99.0
percent for defendants charged in 2006 and 2007 to a low of 90.3 percent
and 88.7 percent for defendants charged in 2012 and 2014. Conviction
rates at trial varied more, peaking at 100 percent when all 11 individuals
charged in 2007 were later convicted at trial. There were 37 defendants
charged during 2005-2007 who went to trial, with all but four defendants
(in two cases) found guilty, an 89.2 percent conviction rate. There were 67
defendants charged over the next seven years who went to trial and 51
were found guilty, a 76 percent conviction rate. The conviction rates were
lowest for defendants charged during 2012, when only 4 of the 8 defendants who went to trial were convicted. Of course, a single year with 8 defendants going to trial does not provide a large enough sample to draw
definitive conclusions—and in 2013 and 2014 the conviction rate was back
up to 88 percent (7 out of 8 defendants charged during those years were

114. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 112, at 17. Note, however, that this
data is for just 2014. If only environmental crimes data for 2014 were utilized, the conviction
rate would be 100 percent because the only environmental crimes defendant charged in
2014 who went to trial was convicted.

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/163
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396643

58

Uhlmann:

Season 201X]

Desktop Publishing Example

159

convicted at trial). The relatively consistent overall conviction rate and the
more uneven conviction rate at trial for individuals charged with environmental crime are shown graphically in FIGURE 23 below.

We analyzed adverse trial outcomes to determine whether any patterns emerged. Based on the number of acquittals, the most frequent statute for acquittals was Title 18, with 15 acquittals. The next highest statute
for acquittals was the Clean Water Act with 8 acquittals, 5 of which involved knowing (felony) violations of the Clean Water Act, and 3 of which
involved negligent (misdemeanor) violations of the Clean Water Act. The
third highest number of acquittals was 7 under the Clean Air Act; no other
statute had more than 1 defendant acquitted. These results track the
charging data, inasmuch as Title 18, the Clean Water Act, and the Clean
Air Act violations are charged more frequently than other forms of environmental crime.
Conviction percentages by statute, as opposed to raw numbers, show
that the Justice Department fares best in hazardous waste cases (RCRA
and CERCLA) but not as well in Title 18, Clean Air Act, and Clean Water
Act cases (in that order). For RCRA and CERCLA, there were 17 defendants who went to trial, and 16 were convicted, an impressive 94.1 percent
conviction rate. Title 18 cases were the largest number of to go to trial,
with 76 defendants and a conviction rate at trial of 80.3 percent. There
were 31 defendants who went to trial in cases brought under the Clean Air
Act, with 24 defendants convicted (a 77.4 percent conviction rate at trial).
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Under the Clean Water Act, 30 defendants went to trial and 22 were convicted, yielding a 73.3 conviction rate at trial. The lower Clean Water Act
conviction rates at trial are somewhat surprising since the Clean Water
Act has the most straightforward statutory prohibition of the environmental
laws. 115 On that basis, I would have expected greater success at trial, although multiple factors could be responsible for the lower conviction rates
in Clean Water Act cases (to include the fact that the Clean Water Act
regulates more pollutants, many of which are not hazardous).
My prior scholarship regarding aggravating factors included the assertion that the government would be more successful at trial if it focused
on violations involving aggravating factors (in addition to the other salutary
benefits of doing so). 116 None of the cases that went to trial involved no
aggravating factor, so it is not possible to make any observations about
the relationship between the absence of aggravating factors and trial outcomes. It also is difficult to determine whether there is any correlation between the presence of one aggravating factor and trial outcomes, because
those sample sizes are small. There were only 2 defendants who went to
trial in cases where only harm was a factor; 1 was convicted, and 1 was
acquitted (a 50 percent conviction rate). When only deceptive or misleading conduct was present, there also were only 2 defendants who went to
trial. Both were convicted (a 100 percent conviction rate), and the same
was true for operating outside the regulatory system (2 defendants, both
convicted at trial, yielding a 100 percent conviction rate). The most defendants (6) went to trial in cases involving only repetitiveness; 3 were
convicted and 3 acquitted, also yielding a 50 percent conviction rate. In
the aggregate then, the conviction rate for cases with one aggravating factors was 67 percent (8 of 12 defendants).
In cases with two or more aggravating factors, many of the sample
sizes were larger. The largest number of defendants to go to trial were
those engaging in repetitive deceptive or misleading conduct (49 defendants). Of that number, 42 were convicted at trial for an 86 percent conviction rate. The next largest category was defendants who engaged in repetitive deceptive or misleading conduct and operated outside the
regulatory system; all 13 were convicted. The third largest category were
11 defendants who repeatedly operated outside the regulatory system, of
which 9 were convicted at trial (an 82 percent conviction rate). The fourth
largest category were defendants who repeatedly engaged in deceptive
or misleading conduct and caused harm. Of those 9 defendants, 6 were
convicted (a 67 percent conviction rate).

115.
116.

See supra Section II.C.
Uhlmann, supra note 4, at 1245.
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It is worth noting that 25 percent of the acquittals from 2005-2014 occurred in two high-profile cases: W.R. Grace (3 individuals acquitted at
trial, along with the corporation) and the Gulf oil spill (2 individuals acquitted in separate trials, while 2 other individuals pleaded guilty as did the
corporate defendants). W.R. Grace was an aggressive case, inasmuch as
it sought to hold the company and its executives criminally responsible for
the ongoing endangerment of the residents of Libby, Montana, based on
conduct that began decades earlier. But it is hard to conclude that it was
not an appropriate case for prosecution given the extent of the harm and
the strength of the evidence that corporate officials knew about the harm
they were causing. Rather, I would fault the trial court judge, who was
openly hostile to the prosecutors throughout the trial (apparently out of
pique for their successful appeals of his pre-trial orders dismissing the
most serious charges), and who improperly excluded significant inculpatory evidence. 117 On the other hand, I have commented already about my
concerns about the prosecution of individuals in the Gulf Oil Spill case, 118
although I have no quarrel with the decision to prosecute the companies
involved, and I would readily acknowledge that reasonable people might
differ about the charges against individual BP officials.
Some acquittals may be the result of compromise verdicts in cases
where both individual and corporate defendants were charged. Our data
includes 11 cases where individuals were acquitted and corporations also
were charged. In those cases, 5 corporate defendants were convicted, 2
pleaded guilty, and 4 were acquitted. In the 7 cases where corporate defendants were convicted, perhaps the acquittals can be explained by the
fact that corporations were convicted instead. In other words, charges may
have been warranted but the case was not egregious enough for the jury
to find individual guilt. On the other hand, corporate guilt does not necessarily mean that the case was appropriate for prosecution. There can be
social pressure on corporations to plead guilty, even in cases where the
misconduct was not particularly egregious, in order to retain goodwill and
reduce public visibility about the incident. Also, while juries are capable of
parsing the evidence and acquitting some defendants while convicting
others, corporations make less sympathetic defendants than individuals.
A more significant question is what happened in the four cases where
juries acquitted all corporate and individual defendants—and whether
117. Kirk Johnson, Chemical Company is Acquitted in Asbestos Case, N.Y. TIMES (May
8, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/09/us/09grace.html. Of the 8 total defendants in
the W.R. Grace case, 4 were acquitted, 3 saw all charges dismissed, and one died while the
case was pending. Id.
118. As I mentioned earlier, the acquittals in the Deepwater Horizon case arguably
were attributable to prosecutorial overreach in bringing manslaughter and Clean Water Act
negligence charges against the well-site leaders. See supra Section III.A.
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those cases involved prosecutorial overreaching. As discussed above,
one of those cases was W.R. Grace, where the government marshaled
substantial evidence that the company knew it was exposing its workers
to grievous harm and more than 200 people have died, but the trial court
judge excluded much of the damaging testimony. The second case involved a company and its employees who raised chlorine levels in
wastewater samples, the kind of deceptive conduct that appears appropriate for criminal prosecution. 119 In the third case, Defendants were issued a temporary emergency permit to dispose of fireworks without a
RCRA permit. After the permit expired, defendants directed their employees to continue without a permit (dismantling commercial grade fireworks
by breaking them apart and soaking them in fuel). An explosion occurred
that killed five employees, the kind of harm alongside intentional misconduct that also appears appropriate for criminal charges.120 Only the last of
these four cases, which involved wetlands charges that have historically
been controversial, arguably might have been better suited to civil enforcement, although whether the case was appropriate for prosecution
would depend on the egregiousness of the violations. 121
Finally, our acquittal data indicates that acquittals typically occur in
multi-defendant cases: 19 of the 20 individual defendants who were acquitted were charged in multi-defendant cases. Of course, other factors
may explain why these acquittals occurred, but multi-defendant cases
pose unique challenges for the government because of proof disparities
and the “piling on” effect of multiple cross-examinations. Proof disparities
are inevitable in multi-defendant cases, since some defendants inevitably
are more responsible than others, which can lead to mixed verdicts or
even across-the-board acquittals if the proof disparities are so great that
the prosecution seems unfair. Moreover, even when proof disparities are
limited, each defendant is entitled to cross-examine witnesses, presenting
the defense two (or more) opportunities to challenge witness testimony.

119. United States v. United Water Envtl. Servs. Inc., No. 2:10-CR-217, 2011 WL
3751303 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 24, 2011).
120. United States v. Donaldson Enterprises, Inc., No. 12-01034, 2016 WL 4445233
(D. Haw. Aug. 22, 2016). Another defendant, Carlton Finley, plead guilty to an Information
charging him with violations related to storage and handling of explosives in return for dismissing the charges in this case.
121. United States v. Palm Beach Polo Holdings, Inc., No. 9:10-CR-80087-WJZ (S.D.
Fla. June 22, 2010). Defendants charged with filling two parcels of land that the government
claims were wetlands. Straub was president of Palm Beach Polo Holdings. Id.
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This dynamic could be further heightened if it were already a questionable
case for prosecution. 122
For the 43 individuals who saw all charges dismissed, the largest
numbers were charged under Title 18 (25 defendants), followed by the
Clean Water Act (14 defendants) and the Clean Air Act (12 defendants).
No other statute had more than 3 defendants dismissed of all charges. In
addition, only 10 individuals charged between 2005 and 2009 saw
charges dismissed, compared to 33 defendants charged between 2010
and 2014, a rather dramatic increase in dismissals. 123
There is some variation between whether aggravating factors are present for dismissed defendants compared to the dataset as a whole. Environmental harm was present in 27.9 percent of the cases where dismissal
occurred, even though it was only present overall in 18.6 percent of the
time with individuals. Likewise, deceptive and misleading conduct was
present in 69.8 percent of dismissals, even though it was only present in
65.2 percent of all cases. There may be factors that explain why these
dismissals occurred, unrelated to the presence of these aggravating factors. But as a general matter, I would have expected prosecutors to be
less likely to dismiss where there was harm and/or deceptive or misleading conduct.
On the other hand, for operating outside the regulatory system and
repetitive misconduct, the numbers were lower for dismissed defendants
than for the dataset as a whole (25.6 percent for operating outside the
regulatory system for dismissed defendants vs. 37.8 percent overall, and
76.7 for repetitive violations for dismissed defendants vs. 83.1 percent
overall). Again, other factors may explain why there were fewer dismissals
in these categories. But I would have expected this to be a higher category
of dismissal, not lower, since operating outside the regulatory system and
repetitiveness, without more, cause varying levels of actual harm.
We also examined dismissal cases individually to determine whether
they might be examples of prosecutorial over-reaching. For this review,
122. We also looked at conviction rates at trial by the number of co-defendants, excluding data involving 7 or more co-defendants due to small samples sizes (only 3 or fewer defendants going to trial). We found that there was no statistically significant relationship between increasing the number of co-defendants and conviction rates in multi-defendant cases
(with conviction rates fluctuating from a high of 87 percent with 6 co-defendants to a low of
70 percent conviction rate with 5 co-defendants). There was, however, a statistically significant difference between having only a single defendant, with a 95.7 percent conviction rate
compared to the 76.8 percent conviction rate seen in multi-defendant cases. To make this
determination, we used a significance level of 0.05, and found the chi-squared value to be
0.0422.
123. When charges were dismissed and refiled, we did not count this as a dismissal as
the government still prosecuted the case. If the charges were subsequently dismissed again,
that was counted as a dismissal.
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we expanded our analysis to include cases involving corporate defendants, bringing the total number of dismissals to 67 defendants. In 35 of the
dismissals, there was at least one conviction amongst the other co-defendants, which suggests that there was a basis for the charges. Six individual defendants were dismissed after a corporation was found or
pleaded guilty. Each of these corporations was small or very small, which
may be a sign of declining to seek double punishment.124 Six other defendants were dismissed after another individual in the case pleaded
guilty, and 3 defendants were dismissed after both individual and corporate defendants pleaded guilty.
We also tried to determine why there was an increase in dismissals
starting in 2010. One factor was that prosecutors allowed more defendants to enter into pre-trial diversion programs. Prior to 2010, only 1 defendant went through a pre-trial diversion program, whereas 7 defendants
were permitted to do so after 2010. Charges against all 8 of those defendants eventually were dismissed. In addition, charges were dismissed
against 2 defendants who died while their cases were pending, against a
third corporate defendant that was controlled by one of the deceased defendants, and against a fourth defendant who was found incompetent to
stand trial; only 1 defendant died during trial prior to 2010.
Once those reasonable dismissals are taken into account, only 19 dismissals remain. Two of those dismissals occurred because the defendant
pleaded guilty in a separate criminal matter, 3 were dismissed because
the defendant cooperated with the government, and 3 were dismissed in
the W.R. Grace case after the acquittals at trial, leaving only 11 defendants whose dismissals may raise questions about the appropriateness of
the charges. When we reviewed those 11 defendants, however, there
were clear justifications for all but 2 of the dismissals. 125
In sum, conviction rates for environmental crime are robust—more so
than for the federal criminal justice system as a whole and for other whitecollar crimes. The strong conviction rate may provide some additional support for the proposition that prosecutors exercise their discretion reasonably under the environmental laws. Conviction rates at trial, on the other

124.
Corporations and the individual owners have separate legal identities and
therefore may both be charged without raising double jeopardy concerns. In my view, however, it is difficult to justify prosecuting both the corporation and its owner when the business is so small that the corporation and the owner are practically one and the same.
Uhlmann, supra note 88, at 1274. It is in that sense that I reference double punishment, not
based on double jeopardy concerns.
125. It would be fair to say that these 9 dismissed defendants involved the kind of dismissals that occur frequently in the criminal justice system: successful motions to suppress
evidence, dismissal so the government could investigate further or proceed on different
charges, defendants who had moved overseas and could not be extradited, and dismissal
based on newly-discovered evidence that made continued prosecution inappropriate.
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hand, do not compare as favorably to the rest of the criminal justice system, which could be a cause for concern. To be sure, prosecutors should
not bring only “easy” cases, so it is not necessary for the government to
have perfect success at trial. In addition, acquittals sometimes happen for
reasons beyond the control of prosecutors, to include how well witnesses
testify, the effectiveness of defense counsel, the conduct of the trial judge,
and the whims of jury decisions. But acquittals always should be examined with regard to whether there is something more fundamental involved
in the unsuccessful outcome at trial, to include possible prosecutorial
overreaching. 126

B. Incarceration Rates for Environmental Crime 127
While conviction rates for environmental crime are robust, the same
cannot be said about incarceration rates. From 2005-2014, the Justice
Department secured 987 convictions of individual defendants for environmental crime. Of that number, only 364 were sentenced to jail for an incarceration rate of 36.9 percent. This number pales in comparison to the
incarceration rate in the federal system, which was 77.6 percent during
fiscal year 2014 according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics. 128 Indeed,
the incarceration rate for environmental crime also is lower than the rate
for regulatory crimes (57 percent), as shown in FIGURE 24 below. 129

126.

The same is true for dismissals.

127. At various points throughout this section we utilized statistical methods to determine whether our results were statistically significant. To test for significance, we performed
a Pearson’s chi-squared test on the variables and used a significance value, α, of 0.05 (which
is a standard α value). In each of these cases, the null hypothesis (the hypothesis we were
testing to prove false) was that there was no relationship between the variables. When this
analysis yielded a p-value of less than 0.05 for a given set of variables, I have noted either
in text or footnotes that the results were statistically significant, which means that the
chances that the observed relationships between the variables can be attributed to chance
is very small. Please note that these tests were performed on only a limited number of datasets for variables where the data was less clear. For more information on the Pearson’s
chi-squared test, please see, e.g., Tutorial: Pearson’s Chi-Squared Test for Independence,
U. PENN. (LING 300, FALL 2008), https://www.ling.upenn.edu/ ~clight/chisquared.html; see
also Using Chi-Squared Statistic in Research, STATISTICS SOLUTIONS, https://www.statisticssolutions.com/using-chi-square-statistic-in-research/ (last accessed Apr. 23, 2019).
128.

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 112, at 21.

129.

Id.
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The low overall incarceration rate for environmental crime is striking, particularly compared to other regulatory crime, and raises concerns about
the deterrent effect of criminal prosecution.
The incarceration rate is lower still for defendants who pleaded guilty
to environmental crime. During the ten years covered by our study, 902
individuals pleaded guilty, with 306 of those defendants sentenced to jail
time, an incarceration rate of 33.9 percent. The percentage of defendants
who were incarcerated after conviction at trial, however, was far higher.
Of the 85 defendants who were found guilty at trial, 58 were sentenced to
jail time, an incarceration rate of 68.2 percent. Defendants convicted at
trial were more than twice as likely to go to jail as defendants who pleaded
guilty. 130
In some respects, the fact that a higher percentage of defendants who
go to trial are sentenced to jail time is unsurprising. The federal sentencing
guidelines lower the adjusted offense levels for defendants who accept
responsibility, and the government often seeks reduced sentences for
those who accept responsibility and plead guilty. Conversely, defendants
who go to trial rarely receive credit under the guidelines for acceptance of
responsibility, and the government nearly always seeks longer sentences
after trial. This is true in all criminal cases.
Nonetheless, the extent of the “trial penalty” in environmental cases
is substantial. Only a third of environmental defendants go to jail after

130.

This result was statistically significant. See supra note 127.
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pleading guilty, while more than two thirds of environmental defendants
go to jail after asserting their rights to a trial. The length of the sentences
that environmental defendants receive when they are convicted at trial
and sentenced to jail also is noteworthy. Of the 58 defendants convicted
at trial and sentenced to jail time, 48 defendants or 82.8 percent received
sentences of 12 months or more imprisonment. In contrast, of the 306 defendants sentenced to jail time after pleading guilty, 173 defendants or
56.5 percent received sentences of 12 months or more imprisonment. 131
Stated differently, only 19.2 percent of defendants who pleaded guilty to
environmental crime went to jail for a year or more, while 56.4 percent of
defendants who were convicted at trial went to jail for a year or more. The
sentences imposed for environmental defendants who plead guilty compared to those for defendants who are convicted at trial and sentenced to
jail are shown in FIGURE 25 below.

We examined incarceration rates over time to determine whether
there were any variations in how often defendants were incarcerated. Our
database begins just when the Supreme Court decided Booker v. United
States, 132 which rendered the federal sentencing guidelines advisory rather than mandatory. On that basis, I might have expected to see larger
numbers of defendants incarcerated in the early years of our database,

131. These percentages exclude the small number of defendants who were sentenced
to time served. If those figures were included, incarceration rates would be somewhat lower.
132.

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226-27 (2005).
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when judges were still conditioned to give weight to the sentencing guidelines calculations, and fewer defendants incarcerated in the later years as
judges became more acclimated to a system where the federal sentencing
guidelines, which required incarceration, had become advisory.
Initially, the data seems consistent with the assumption that judges
were more likely to impose shorter sentences post-Booker. For cases
charged during 2005, the year Booker was decided, 10 defendants convicted at trial were sentenced to more than a year in jail. For defendants
charged from 2006-2010, however, just 21 defendants convicted at trial
were sentenced to more than a year in jail, and never more than 6 defendants in a single year (2009). But then 10 defendants charged in 2011 were
convicted at trial and sentenced to jail to more than a year in jail—and then
only 6 defendants charged from 2012-2014 and convicted at trial were
sentenced to more than a year in jail. In other words, the trial and incarceration data might support an inference that judges were imposing
shorter sentences post-Booker, but only if we can disregard defendants
charged in 2011.
Nor does our data indicate that judges were imposing shorter sentences after Booker when we focus on guilty pleas that resulted in jail sentences of more than a year in jail. For defendants charged in 2005 who
pleaded guilty, 17 were sentenced to more than a year in jail, nearly identical to the number of defendants charged in 2006 (18) and 2007 (17). The
numbers dipped the next two years, to 12 and 14 respectively, before
climbing again in 2010 (18). For defendants charged in 2011 and 2013,
the numbers climbed higher still—25 defendants sentenced to more than
a year in jail each year—suggesting that the overall number of convicted
defendants going to jail for more than a year has not decreased since the
Booker decision. We see relatively similar trends when we analyze based
on the percentage of defendants going to jail for a year or more, as shown
in FIGURE 26 below.
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An alternative hypothesis is that judges continued to impose lengthy
sentences post-Booker but that a larger number of defendants do not go
to jail at all—or that more defendants receive short jail sentences. That
would be consistent with the fear that environmental prosecutors expressed when the Supreme Court decided the case, namely that judges
would not sentence environmental defendants to jail or to lengthy jail sentences if the federal sentencing guidelines were advisory instead of mandatory. But our data does not show more probationary sentences or an
increased number of short jail sentences post-Booker. It might still be the
case that Booker changed how judges approach sentencing but our data
does not indicate that occurred.
We also analyzed incarceration rates by statute, which showed potentially significant disparities. Defendants convicted under APPS went to
jail least often, only 19 percent of the time, followed by Clean Water Act
defendants at 25 percent of the time. Title 18 and Clean Air Act defendants
were more likely to go to jail—both 47 percent of the time—but the highest
percentages of defendants going to jail were RCRA defendants (54 percent) and CERCLA defendants (67 percent). 133 It is difficult to determine
based on the data why these disparities exist, but a potential explanation
is that APPS and Clean Water Act violations often involve non-hazardous
pollutants; the Clean Air Act, RCRA, and CERCLA all involve pollutants,

133.

This was found to be statistically significant. See supra note 127.
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waste, or substances that are hazardous. (Title 18 addresses both hazardous and non-hazardous activity.)
The results are similar when we break down incarceration rates based
on guilty pleas and guilty verdicts. For guilty pleas, the fewest defendants
go to jail for convictions under the Clean Water Act (22 percent) and APPS
(23 percent). Title 18 defendants and Clean Air Act defendants go to jail
the same amount of time (43 percent) and RCRA defendants (49 percent)
go to jail most often. For guilty verdicts, CERCLA (100 percent), 134 RCRA
(83 percent) and Clean Air Act (78 percent) defendants go to jail most
often, followed by the Clean Water Act and Title 18 (both 70 percent). Incarceration rates by statute are shown in FIGURE 27 below.

Finally, we also assessed the relationship between incarceration and
aggravating factors. I would expect to see a correlation between the presence of multiple aggravating factors and incarceration, inasmuch as more
egregious violations warrant greater sanction. For the most part that relationship is present: defendants with three or more aggravating factors
went to jail just over half the time, while defendants with two aggravating

134. For CERCLA cases, however, it should be pointed out that our dataset was quite
small – there were only 4 defendants facing CERCLA charges who went to trial from 20052014.
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factors went to jail 35 percent of the time, and defendants with one aggravating factor went to jail 28 percent of the time. Defendants with no aggravating factors went to jail least often, just 12 percent of the time.135
The relationship between incarceration and aggravating factors is
shown in FIGURE 28, with the overall outcomes below the bar graphs and
the breakdown for defendants who pleaded guilty and those who were
convicted at trial demonstrated by the bar graphs.

The relationship between aggravating factos and incarceration is even
more pronounced for defendants who were convicted at trial. Only half of
the defendants who went to trial in cases with one aggravating factor
present went to jail; all of the defendants who went to trial in cases with all
four aggravating factors present went to jail.
Moreover, the relationship between incarceration and aggravating
factors persists when we reviewed defendants who went to jail for a year
or more. Defendants with three or more aggravating factors went to jail for
a year or more 36.3 percent of the time, defendants with two aggravating
factors went to jail for a year or more 24.7 percent of the time, and defendants with one aggravating factor went to jail 15 percent of the time. Defendants with no aggravating factors never went to jail for a year or more.
The one caveat to the correlation between incarceration and aggravating factors is that defendants with all four aggravating factors were not
more likely to go to jail than defendants with three aggravating factors.
135. This data was also found to be statistically significant using a Chi-squared test and
a significance level of 0.05. See supra note 127.
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Defendants with four aggravating factors went to jail 51.5 percent of the
time, compared to 51.6 percent for defendants with three aggravating factors, a virtually identical result. This appears to be a function of defendants
who pleaded guilty, who went to jail 50 percent of the time when three
aggravating factors were present but only 41 percent of the time when four
aggravating factors were present. Perhaps the similarity between defendants with three and four aggravating factors is a function of the small sample size of four-factor defendants—less than 4 percent of our entire dataset—or there is an unknown mitigating factor present for our four-factor
defendants. But it is possible that judges do not view violations with four
aggravating factors as any more egregious than those with three aggravating factors, at least when they plead guilty.

CONCLUSION
The updated data from the Environmental Crimes Project continues
to demonstrate that prosecutors are exercising their discretion to reserve
criminal charges for conduct involving one or more of the aggravating factors I have identified in my scholarship—and that defendants who commit
violations that do not involve those factors will not face criminal prosecution. Prosecutors continue to focus on violations that involve harm, deceptive or misleading conduct, or operating outside the regulatory system—
and in most cases look for a combination of one or more of those factors
plus repetitiveness. Relatively few cases involve isolated misconduct.
We see an increase in the number of defendants charged with Clean
Air Act violations, particularly those that involve violations other than asbestos abatement, and we see an increase in endangerment charges under the Clean Air Act. Both are potentially significant shifts. At the same
time, we see a moderate decrease in the number of Clean Water Act
charges, but no indication that there are fewer Clean Water Act cases
since the Supreme Court decision in Rapanos. We also see a significant
decrease in RCRA hazardous waste charges. In terms of individual aggravating factors, our data is largely consistent, with one exception. We
see a sizeable increase in the number of defendants operating outside the
regulatory system, which is noteworthy because it occurred even though
we have become more restrictive in the circumstances where we code
defendants as operating outside the regulatory system.
We reported for the first time conviction rates and incarceration rates
for environmental crime—the former more impressive than in the federal
system generally, the latter much less so. We do not see consistent evidence of lower incarceration rates since the Supreme Court decision in
Booker. We detect less impressive conviction rates in cases going to trial
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in recent years, which alongside lower prosecutions levels raises questions about the impact of declining EPA agent resources. The combination
of declining case numbers, fewer convictions at trial, and lower than average incarceration rates does not bode well for the deterrent effects of environmental prosecution.
Overall, the latest data from the Environmental Crimes Project continues to show that prosecutors exercise their discretion reasonably, which
is positive from a normative standpoint. Prosecutors also appear to be
moving beyond traditional areas of criminal enforcement activity in ways
that have been contemplated for years, also a positive development. But
there are areas for concern going forward, particularly with regard to agent
resources, fewer prosecutions, and relatively weak incarceration rates.
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